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THE ADOPTION  of short-run monetary targets has been the most signifi- 
cant development  in the practice  of central  banking  during  the 1970s, at 
least in the context of domestic  monetary  policy. The central  banks of 
most of the industrialized  Western  economies  now use explicit  targets  for 
monetary  growth  in formulating  and implementing  monetary  policy. In 
the United States the Federal Reserve System moved informally  to a 
greater  emphasis  on the monetary  aggregates  in early 1970; and since 
1975 the Congress,  under House Concurrent  Resolution 133, has re- 
quired  the Chairman  of the Federal Reserve Board to report formally 
each quarter  the specific  monetary-growth  targets  chosen  by the Federal 
Open  Market  Committee  as the near-term  objective  of monetary  policy. 
Private  economic  analysts  in turn  have come to focus on such announce- 
ments, and comparing  each Thursday's  new money statistics  against  the 
corresponding  target  values  is now the economic  highlight  of the week in 
the financial  markets.  In short,  the era of monetary  policy by monetary 
targets  has arrived. 
For the most part, both academic  economists  and the business  com- 
munity  have  welcomed  this  development.  During  the mid-1960s  a number 
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of researchers  had  pointed  out logical  flaws  in the Federal  Reserve's  oper- 
ating  strategy  of orienting  monetary  policy so as to maintain  the banking 
system's  net free-reserve  position,  and the acceleration  of price inflation 
later  in the decade  brought  out the ambiguities  in the subsequent  strategy 
of setting policy according  to observed (nominal) short-term  interest 
rates. As inflation  persisted  and, indeed, accelerated  in the 1970s, the 
relevance  to monetary  policy of the long-run  relationship  between  money 
and prices became clear. In addition,  many who had criticized  federal 
budget  deficits  and  had also observed  the tendency  of monetary  growth  to 
be greatest  at times of substantial  deficit  spending  welcomed  the "disci- 
pline" that resistance  to monetary  expansion imposed on the federal 
budget.  If the old "Treasury  view"  that  the financing  requirements  associ- 
ated with budget deficits  rendered  fiscal policy impotent  was not valid 
independently,  then adherence  to unchanging  monetary-growth  targets 
helped to make it so. The adoption  of monetary-growth  targets  as the 
focus of monetary  policy therefore  accomplished  several purposes  and 
thus  has attracted  support  from  diverse  constituencies. 
Nevertheless,  after  the initial  burst  of enthusiasm,  it is appropriate  to 
scrutinize  the use of monetary-growth  targets,  and to determine  whether 
or not this approach  meets  the requirements  of sound  policymaking.  This 
paper  asks, in other  words,  whether  the monetary-target  strategy  serves 
the intended  purposes  of monetary  policy about  as well as other  plausible 
structures.  Alternatively,  is it possible,  within  the limitations  imposed  by 
the current  state of economic  knowledge,  either  to devise a different  but 
superior  approach  to monetary  policymaking  or to suggest  sensible  ways 
of adapting  and improving  the monetary-target  approach  itself? 
Two caveats  regarding  the paper's  perspective  should  be stated  at the 
outset. 
First, whether  the paper's  central  message  constitutes  a tribute  to or 
an indictment  of current  U.S. monetary  policy depends  ultimately  on a 
judgment  of what  the Federal  Reserve  System  really  does. One can argue, 
for example,  that no reasonable  central  banker  would  in practice  formu- 
late and  implement  monetary  policy according  to the monetary-target  ap- 
proach  as described  in this paper.  The counter  to this objection  is that, 
while no one book-let  alone one paper-can  encompass all of  the 
subtleties  of the art of central  banking,  the characterization  of the mone- 
tary-target  strategy  analyzed  here is to a first  approximation  a faithful  if 
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major outlines-including by the Congress  under Resolution 133. To 
what  extent  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  in fact currently  follows 
this procedure  is a positive  empirical  question  that lies beyond  the scope 
of this  paper,  but the paper's  normative  conclusions  are  relevant  to future 
decisions about monetary  policy regardless  of what has happened in 
the  past.' 
Second,  this paper accepts at face value the proposition  that central 
bankers  are competent  men and women who take decisions  to advance 
the public  weal, guided  both by the intent  of Congress  and by their own 
values  and  intelligence.  The analyst  who starts  from  the premise  that the 
policymaker  is either a fool or a scoundrel  will inevitably  find superior 
whatever  policymaking  framework  imposes the tightest  straitjacket  and 
thereby ensures the maximum  protection against malfeasance due to 
ignorance  or rascality.2  By contrast,  the central  question  of this paper  is 
how best to enable the central  bank to pursue  those ultimate  objectives 
that  it deems  appropriate.3 
The first two sections of the paper analyze, at the conceptual  level, 
the use of monetary  targets  as the focus of short-run  monetary  policy. 
The first section  briefly  reviews  some pertinent  aspects  of the history  of 
the adoption  of monetary-growth  targets,  as well as some  familiar  aspects 
of the theory of monetary  policy. The next section begins by defining 
the "intermediate  target"  policy approach.  In particular,  the discussion 
here  uses several  examples  to emphasize  that  the key rationale  underlying 
the intermediate-target  approach-whether the intermediate  target  is the 
money  stock or any other  variable-is  the existence  of some asymmetry 
in the flow of scarce  information  in an uncertain  world.  This section  then 
goes on to analyze  two principal  drawbacks  of the intermediate-target  ap- 
proach  as implemented  by the Federal  Reserve:  The first  is the exclusion, 
1. Some critics of recent U.S. monetary policy have alleged that the Federal Re- 
serve's  purported  emphasis  on monetary-growth  targets  is largely rhetorical,  and that 
the concern to stabilize short-run fluctuations in short-term interest rates has pre- 
cluded  monetary control in any real sense. For evidence to the contrary,  however, see 
Paul DeRosa and Gary H. Stern, "Monetary  Control and the Federal Funds Rate," 
Journal  of Monetary  Economics, vol. 3 (April 1977), pp. 217-30. 
2. The ignorance that matters in this context is not simple ignorance about how 
the economy works but, instead, ignorance about how much is known of the econ- 
omy's workings. 
3. The legal status of the central bank in the United States makes clear that it is 
the Federal Reserve's  responsibility  to pursue  whatever  ultimate targets  for economic 
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as a result  of the partially  mistaken  emphasis  on the "controllability"  of 
the intermediate  target,  of potentially  valuable  information  that  bears  on 
appropriate  policy  actions  but arises  from  sources  other  than  observations 
of the money stock. The second is the incorrect  incorporation,  except 
under  very restrictive  assumptions,  of even the limited  information  that 
the  intermediate-target  approach  does  use. 
The third section evaluates  empirically  the way in which the inter- 
mediate-target  approach  based  on the  money  stock  as the  intermediate  tar- 
get variable  incorrectly  incorporates  the information  contained  in obser- 
vations  of the money stock. To gain an idea of the relevant  magnitudes 
involved  in the preceding  analytical  discussion,  the paper develops and 
estimates,  using  U.S. data, a simple "bare  essentials"  macroeconometric 
model consisting  of only five behavioral  equations:  real spending (the 
"IS"  curve), price  setting,  money  demand  (the "LM"  curve), money  sup- 
ply, and  the term  structure  of interest  rates.  Apart  from  the separation  of 
the determination  of real income and prices,  which  is unusual  in a small 
empirical  macro model, this model has several interesting  features- 
including  open-economy  effects on both real income and prices, effects 
of debt-management  policy on the term structure,  and evidence that 
bank-portfolio  behavior underlying  the money-supply  process differs 
from that assumed  by familiar  models. Here again,  however,  a word of 
caution is in order. The paper does not offer this small model as the 
best state-of-the-art  representation  of knowledge  of the U.S. economy, 
nor does it attempt  to use the model to derive specific  monetary-policy 
rules to recommend  to the Federal Open Market Committee.  Instead, 
the  objective  is simply  to illustrate  the  gross  orders  of magnitude  of several 
interesting  aspects  of the monetary-policy  process  based  on the monetary- 
target  approach.  For purposes  of such illustration,  compactness  and ana- 
lytical tractability  take precedence  over elaborate  specification  searches, 
complex  lag structures,  and  comprehensive  lists of supposedly  exogenous 
variables. 
A final section summarizes  the paper's  principal  findings  and states 
their  implications  for the conduct  of monetary  policy. 
Historical  Background  and  Analytical First  Principles 
It is an historical  curiosity  that open market  operations  (that is, the 
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Reserve System), which today constitute  the most important  tool of 
monetary  policy,  were  not even contemplated  as such  in the 1913 Federal 
Reserve Act. Consequently,  the strategy  and tactics for exercising  this 
means  of economic  control  evolved  only after  the realization  in the 1920s 
of how and why it worked. The establishment  of the Federal Open 
Market Committee  led temporarily  to an increasing  reliance on open 
market  operations,4  but monetary  policy turned  in other directions  after 
the depression  set in; and thereafter  the Federal  Reserve's  wartime  com- 
mitment  to support  the prices  of Treasury  debt  issues  precluded  an active 
policy. Only after 1951, when the Treasury-Federal  Reserve  Accord re- 
lieved the central  bank of this obligation,  did the use of open market 
operations  for macroeconomic  policy  purposes  finally  come into its own. 
THE  ADVENT  OF  MONETARY-GROWTH  TARGETS 
During  the first  years  after  the accord,  the Open  Market  Committee  fo- 
cused  monetary  policy  on controlling  the net  free  reserves  (excess  reserves 
less borrowed  reserves) of the commercial  banking  system, adhering  to 
a theory of open market  operations  based on the sources and uses of 
member-bank  reserves developed by Winfield Riefler and Randolph 
Burgess.5  On the twin assumptions  of interest-inelastic  demand  for excess 
reserves  and reluctance  to borrow  at the discount  window,  net free re- 
serves  measured  banks'  willingness  to extend  loans and create deposits, 
and hence measured  the effect of monetary  policy in stimulating  or re- 
tarding  nonfinancial  economic  activity.  In addition,  net free reserves  ap- 
peared  to constitute  the perfect  "money  market"  variable-a  close proxy 
for interest  rates, yet not itself an interest  rate and hence not a contra- 
diction  of the accord. 
Within  a decade,  however,  economists  raised  telling  objections  to the 
free-reserves  strategy.  Karl Brunner  and Allan Meltzer,  in a report  pre- 
pared for a fiftieth anniversary  review of the Federal Reserve System 
4.  It was originally called the Open Market  Investment  Committee,  was renamed 
the Open Market Policy Conference in 1930, and given its current  name in the mid- 
193Os.  For related  historical  background,  see Milton Friedman  and Anna J. Schwartz, 
A Monetary  History of the United  States, 1867-1960 (Princeton  University Press for 
the National Bureau  of Economic Research, 1963), especially chap. 6. 
5. Winfield W. Riefler, Money Rates and Money Markets in the United States 
(Harper, 1930);  and W. Randolph Burgess, The Reserve Banks and the Money 
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in 1964,6 strongly  criticized  the use of free reserves  as an "indicator"  of 
the effect of monetary  policy. At about the same time James  Meigs and 
others showed that, since the demands  by banks for both borrowed  re- 
serves and excess reserves  were  interest  elastic,  the banking  system's  de- 
sired  free reserves  depended  on the discount  rate and on market  yields;7 
hence what mattered,  from the standpoint  of both money (or credit) 
creation and the impact on economic activity, was not observed free 
reserves  but  the difference  between  them  and  desired  free  reserves.8 
When the debates of the mid-1960s exposed the flaws in the free- 
reserves  strategy,  the Open Market  Committee  adopted  the strategy  of 
setting some short-term  interest rate (first the Treasury  bill rate, and 
later the federal  funds rate). Apart  from any slippage  in the term  struc- 
ture of interest  rates, this strategy  represented  in the first instance an 
effort to concentrate  on the influence  of monetary  policy on economic 
activity  via the relationships  summarized  in the Hicksian IS curve. In 
addition,  after 1965, Regulation  Q, which imposed ceilings on deposit 
interest rates, rendered  short-term  market interest rates important  in 
another  way,  given  the peculiar  institutional  features  of the U.S. mortgage 
market  and  the associated  cyclical  role  of homebuilding. 
Several  related strands  of criticism,  however, all advanced  the con- 
clusion that the strategy  based on market  interest rates suffered  from 
essentially  the same  drawback  that defeated  the free-reserves  strategy.  In 
particular,  it was not appropriate  to regard  monetary  policy as steady (or 
changing) just because market  interest rates were fixed (or moving); 
instead, what mattered  was the relationship  between observed  interest 
rates and something  else-something that was at best difficult  to deter- 
mine. One facet of the development  of this argument  was the debate  that 
6.  Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer, The Federal Reserve's  Attachment to the 
Free Reserve Concept, Prepared  for the Subcommittee  on Domestic Finance of the 
House Committee on  Banking and Currency, 88:2  (Government Printing Office, 
1964). 
7.  A. James Meigs, Free Reserves and the Money Supply (University of Chicago 
Press, 1962). 
8. Especially in the context of this paper's  focus on monetary targets, it is useful 
to distinguish two aspects of  the  1960s criticism of  the free-reserves mechanism: 
first, that the banking system's observed free-reserves  position was a poor indicator 
of the effect of monetary  policy on nonfinancial  economic activity; and, second, that 
the free-reserves  position was a poor instrument  for controlling the money stock. The 
latter criticism  was somewhat beside the point, since the Federal Reserve at that time 
placed little emphasis on the money stock and did not construe free reserves as a 
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ensued  from the submission  by Milton Friedman  and David Meiselman 
to the Commission  on Money and Credit,  attempting  to show empirically 
that the IS curve (or  "multiplier  relation") which the interest-rate 
strategy  exploited  was less reliable (that is, less stable) than the money- 
income  relation,  or licksian LM curve.9  At the conceptual  level, William 
Poole showed,  in the context  of a simplified  stochastic  model, the condi- 
tions under which a strategy for monetary policy based on interest 
rates and exploiting  the IS curve was preferable  to one based on the 
money  stock  and  exploiting  the LM curve.10  Events  played  a part,  too, as 
the acceleration  and increasing  volatility  of price inflation  rendered  the 
inference  of a "real"  market  rate  of interest  ever  more  difficult.  To the ex- 
tent that allowing  for price expectations  is basic to interpreting  observed 
(nominal) interest  rates as "indicators"  of the likely effect of monetary 
policy on nonfinancial  economic activity, calculating  such corrections 
had  become  extremely  complicated  by 1970; and  the  merits  of the strategy 
based on money-growth  targets, advocated most notably by Milton 
Friedman,  seemed  both more obvious and more relevant.:" 
After some unsuccessful  experimentation  in the late 1960s with a 
"proviso"  approach,  according  to which  the Manager  of the Open  Market 
Account pursued  a stated  interest-rate  objective  provided  that doing so 
did not cause an aggregate  measure  to deviate from a predetermined 
range,  in 1970 the Open  Market  Committee  adopted  an operating  strategy 
9.  Milton Friedman and David Meiselman, "The Relative Stability of Monetary 
Velocity and the Investment Multiplier in the United States, 1897-1958," in Stabili- 
zation Policies, Prepared  for the Commission on Money and Credit (Prentice-Hall, 
1963), pp. 165-268. Several years later the work of Andersen and Jordan  and others 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis returned,  in a somewhat different  context, 
to the stability of the money-income relation; see Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. 
Jordan, "Monetary  and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance  in Eco- 
nomic Stabilization,"  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol. 50 (November 
1968), pp. 11-24. 
10. William Poole, "Optimal  Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments  in a Simple 
Stochastic Macro Model," Quarterly  Journal of Econiomics,  vol.  84 (May  1970), 
pp. 197-216. 
11. Milton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability (Fordham University 
Press, 1959); Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," American Economic Re- 
view, vol. 58 (March 1968), pp. 1-17. For an interesting  account of the increased  ap- 
peal of monetarist  approaches,  to theory as well as policy, during  inflationary  times, 
see Harry G.  Johnson, "The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter- 
Revolution,"  American Economic Review, vol. 61 (May 1971), pp. 1-14, 300  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
based  on  monetary-growth  targets  (or  "monetary  aggregates")).12  Direc- 
tives to the manager continued to specify a narrowly constrained federal 
funds rate, but with a clear understanding that this practice was in large 
part meant to  achieve a desired  (or  "targeted") rate of growth of  the 
monetary aggregates. 
The Open Market Committee's new approach to monetary policy has 
subsequently evolved into a well-defined two-stage procedure.13  First, at 
the "strategy"  level, once per quarter  the committee translates its ultimate 
policy aims (in terms of the economy's growth, employment, price sta- 
bility, and so  on)  into  a set of  desired growth rates for the monetary 
aggregates over the next year. Because it will choose a new set of desired 
one-year growth rates three months later, however, only the first quarter 
of this one-year extrapolation is of direct operational relevance. Second, 
at the "tactics" level, within the quarter the committee determines how 
best to manipulate the instruments over which it can exert close control 
(such as nonborrowed bank reserves, or a short-term interest rate)  so as 
to  cause the  designated monetary aggregates to  move  in the  specified 
way; in practice the committee has typically used the federal funds rate 
in this instrument role. Although the committee meets formally only once 
a month, it occasionally uses telephone conferences to make additional 
within-quarter  adjustments  in the setting of the funds rate aimed at achiev- 
ing the desired  monetary  growth,  subject  only to the need to avoid  undue 
instability  in the money  market."4  In addition,  the committee's  specified 
12. The aggregate  most typically used in the "proviso  clause," however, was not 
a money-stock measure but rather either the "bank  credit proxy"-total  bank credit 
as implicitly measured by an adjustment  to total bank liabilities-or  member-bank 
reserves. 
13. Several Federal Reserve economists have provided useful descriptions  of the 
workings of U.S. monetary policy under the monetary-growth-target  approach.  See, 
for example, Richard G. Davis, "Implementing  Open Market Policy with Monetary 
Aggregate Objectives,"  in Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monetary  Aggregates 
and Monetary Policy (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1974), pp. 7-19; James 
L. Pierce, "Quantitative  Analysis for Decisions at the Federal Reserve,"  Annals of 
Economic and Social Measurement, vol.  3  (January 1974),  pp.  11-19; William 
Poole, "The Making of Monetary Policy: Description and Analysis,"  in Federal Re- 
serve Bank of  Boston, New England Economic Review (March/April  1975), pp. 
21-30;  and Richard G.  Davis,  "Role of  Monetary Targets in Monetary Policy" 
(paper delivered  at the Seventeenth  Central  Banking  Seminar,  Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, April 5, 1977; processed). 
14. I have discussed elsewhere the rationale and problems associated with the 
objective of preserving stability in the money market; see Benjamin M. Friedman, 
"Empirical  Issues in Monetary  Policy: A Review of Monetary  Aggregates  and Mone- 
tary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 3 (January 1977), pp. 87-101, Benjamin  M. Friedman  301 
range  for the federal  funds  rate gives the manager  some  latitude  to move 
this  instrument  as he thinks  necessary  for closer  monetary  control. 
With  only occasional  minor  variations,  the Open Market  Committee 
has continued  to adhere  to this basic two-stage  structure  in its operating 
approach.'5  In addition,  since early 1975 this procedure  has become  fur- 
ther  formalized  with the adoption  by the Congress  of House Concurrent 
Resolution 133, which requires  the Chairman  of the Federal Reserve 
Board  to specify  publicly,  once each  quarter,  the current  monetary-growth 
targets. 
In the meanwhile,  the advent  of monetary-growth  targets  has not been 
limited  to the United States. The Deutsche Bundesbank  and the Swiss 
National  Bank  adopted  this strategy  in 1975, as have  several  other  central 
banks since. Moreover,  the Bank for International  Settlements  has offi- 
cially endorsed  this strategy,  and the International  Monetary  Fund  made 
its use by the Bank of England  a precondition  to its $3.9 billion loan to 
Britain  in 1977. 
With  so many  countries  following  the monetary-target  strategy,  a closer 
examination  of its merits  is in order.  Further  understanding  of how the 
procedure  works  and  what  tacit assumptions  it entails  is of value  in itself, 
and any improvements  that can be devised for such a widely applied 
policy  procedure  are  well worth  the effort. 
STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
William  Poole's  demonstration  of the conditions  under  which  a money- 
stock approach  to monetary  policy dominates  an analogous  interest-rate 
approach,  or vice versa, emphasized  the distinction  between separate 
disturbances  arising  from two aspects  of economic  behavior:'6  First, the 
and also, "The  Information  Value of Observing  Monetary Policy Deliberations,"  dis- 
cussion paper 550  (Harvard University, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 
May 1977;  processed). 
15. For a discussion of the mercifully brief fiasco involving the role of reserves 
on private nonbank  deposits, see Alan R. Holmes, Paul Meek, and Rudolf Thunberg, 
"Open Market Operations  in the Early 1970's: Excerpts from Reports Prepared in 
1971, 1972, and 1973,"  in Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monetary  Aggregates 
and Monetary Policy, pp.  114-34; and Friedman, "Empirical  Issues in Monetary 
Policy." 
16. Especially since the quadrupling  of  oil prices by the OPEC cartel and the 
subsequent severe recession in  1974-75,  many economists have also emphasized 
"supply shocks" as a third major source of economic instability;  see, for example, 
Stanley Fischer, "Wage-Indexation  and Macro-economic Stability" (Massachusetts 
Institute  of Technology, rev., March 1976;  processed). 302  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
greater  the instability  of the economy's  spending  behavior,  for given  inter- 
est rates  and  other  factors,  the less effective  is a monetary-policy  strategy 
based on controlling  interest  rates and the more effective  by comparison 
is the alternative  money-stock  strategy.  Second,  the greater  the instability 
of the economy's  portfolio behavior (in particular  the demand  by the 
nonbank  public for cash balances), for given interest  rates and income 
and  other  factors,  the less effective  is a monetary-policy  strategy  based  on 
controlling  the money  stock and the more effective  by comparison  is the 
alternative  interest-rate  strategy.  In addition  to the crucial  role of these 
two stochastic  elements,  Poole showed how some of the deterministic 
aspects  of economic  behavior  (especially  the relative  interest  elasticities 
of the demand  for cash balances  and the demand  for real commodities) 
also influence  the comparative  effectiveness  of the alternative  strategies. 
In formal  terms,  Poole's  analysis  relied  on a nondynamic  two-equation 
stochastic  Hicksian  IS-LM  model, 
(1)  Yt=  airt +  a'zt +  Uist 
(2)  Mt  =  bjYt +  b2rt  +  b'zt +  ULMt, 
where 
Y  =  income 
r =  "the" interest rate 
z =  a vector  of values  of relevant  variables  exogenous  to the mone- 
tary  policy  process  (perhaps  including  fiscal  policy) 
M =  the money stock 
a, b = fixed (and known) coefficients 
u1Is,  uA-  =  zero-mean  disturbance  terms  corresponding  to the IS and  LM 
relations,  respectively,  with finite variances  a2  and  U2  and 
covariance  Urs,LM. 
The anticipated  signs of the scalar  coefficients  are b, > 0 > al, b2;  and 
a and  b are  vectors  of coefficients  applicable  to all exogenous  variables  in 
z, including  the intercepts  in the two equations  and also including  zeroes 
for cases in which an individual  exogenous  variable  does not appear  in 
either  equation. 
Since this two-equation  system  with three  variables  (other than z)  is 
determined  by taking either r or M to be exogenous, the model is a 
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money-stock  strategies.  In particular,  under  the interest-rate  strategy  the 
implied  reduced-form  equation  that  determines  income, 
(3)  Yt =  Ort  +  O'zt  +  EYt9 
simply  reduces  to the IS curve,  while under  the money-stock  strategy  the 
analogous  reduced-form  equation  for income, 
(4)  Yt =  Mt  +  qYZt +  Yt9 
is a solved-out  combination  of the IS and  LM curves  together.'7 
If the objective  of policy  is to minimize  the expected  squared  deviation 
of income  from  the corresponding  desired  level, say Y*, then substituting 
Y* into either  of equations  3 or 4 and solving,  the reduced  form  for either 
the interest  rate  or the money  stock accordingly  gives the respective  opti- 
mal policies, say r2*  and M* 18  Both policies lead to the identical  condi- 
tional expectation  E(Yt)  =  Y*, but, since the two reduced-form  distur- 
bances et  and 4,t  differ, the corresponding expected squared deviations 
differ  as well. The reduced-form  equation  3 under  the interest-rate  stra- 
tegy  is simply  the IS curve,  so that 
(5)  eYt  =  Urst 
and  the  value  of the policy  objective  is 
2  )2  _  =  2 
(6)  OYr  (  S 
By contrast, the reduced-form equation 4 under the money-stock strategy 
combines the IS and LM curves, so that 
(7)  =Yt  (alb, +  b2)-'(b2urst  -  aluLMt) 
17. The comparison  of these two derived reduced forms rests on the assumption 
that the underlying  economic behavior specified  in the IS and LM curves is invariant 
to the central bank's choice of operating strategies. For a challenge to this assump- 
tion, see Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Policy Evaluation: A Critique,"  in Karl 
Brunner and Allan  H. Meltzer,  eds.,  The Phlillips Curve and Labor Markets  (North- 
Holland, 1976), pp. 19-46. Allowing for Lucas'  point, which is based on the assump- 
tion of  "rational"  expectations on the part of  the actors whose behavior is sum- 
marized  in the IS and LM curves, would require  analyzing  the changes  in the relevant 
behavior and would thereby take the analysis too far afield from the intended focus 
of this paper. 
18. Poole also considered a "combination"  policy focusing on both the money 
stock and the interest rate; see Poole, "Optimal  Choice of Monetary Policy Instru- 
ments." An analog to this combination  policy is especially relevant in the discussion 
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and  the  value  of the  policy  objective  is 
(8)  a' I  E(ryt)M  =  (alb, +  b2)2 (b20is  -  2ab2TIS,  LM  +  a2TLM)2 
Hence the superiority  of either the interest-rate  or the money-stock 
strategy,  given by the comparison  of the respective  expected squared 
deviations aw,2  and a42M, depends  not only on the variance-covariance 
structure  of the stochastic  elements  of the IS-LM  model but also on the 
values of its three slope coefficients.  The relevance of this normative 
analysis  to the prior (and ongoing) discussion  of positive  issues  is imme- 
diate. In particular,  the familiar  monetarist  contention  that the demand 
for money  is both stable (that is, cT2M is small  in comparison  to als)  and 
interest  inelastic (b2  is small  in absolute  value) directly  implies  the supe- 
riority  of the money-stock  approach.  The choice of a monetary-growth 
target  rather  than an interest-rate  target,  at the strategy  level of the two- 
stage  decision  framework  used by the Open  Market  Committee,  therefore 
reflects  a judgment  that  the underlying  economic  parameters  are  such  that 
YI.ym  is indeed smaller than ?YIr 
The reason  why  there  must  be a tactics  level of the two-stage  monetary- 
policy process is that, at a more realistic level of analysis, the Open 
Market  Committee  cannot  simply  exogenize  the money stock.19  Instead, 
under  the U.S. fractional-reserve  banking  system  in which portfolio  de- 
cisions by individual  banks determine  their net free reserves,  the com- 
mittee  must  affect  the money  stock  indirectly  by influencing  the actions  of 
banks  and  deposit  holders.  Other  institutional  features  of the U.S. banking 
system,  such as different  reserve  requirements  on different  classes  of bank 
liabilities  and the large (and variable) fraction  of deposits  held in banks 
that are not members  of the Federal  Reserve  System,  further  complicate 
the determination  of the money stock, over and above the more funda- 
mental  problem  associated  with  banks'  portfolio  choices. 
At the tactics  level, the Open  Market  Committee  again  has a choice- 
this time of the instrument  that it uses to control the money stock. As 
James Pierce and Thomas Thomson demonstrated,  the second-stage 
choice between nonborrowed  reserves (or the nonborrowed  monetary 
base) and a short-term  interest rate as the instrument  for controlling 
19. Poole's original paper also acknowledged  this point; see ibid., p. 198. See also 
William Poole  and Charles Lieberman, "Improving Monetary Control," BPEA, 
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the money stock is analytically  similar  to the first-stage  choice between 
the money stock and the interest  rate as means of influencing  income.20 
The committee's  current  tactics,  based on closely controlling  the federal 
funds  rate,  essentially  exploit  the LM curve  to influence  the demand  of the 
nonbank  public  for money  balances.  The alternative  approach  based on 
controlling  nonborrowed  reserves would exploit both money-demand 
behavior  and  a money-supply  relation, 
(9)  Mg =  ciRt +  c2rt  +  C'Zt  +  UMst, 
where  R is the stock of reserves,  U,, is a further  disturbance  comparable 
to u., and  ULM, and the usually  anticipated  signs  of the scalar  coefficients 
are  c1,c2 >  0. Whether  reserves  or the interest  rate constitutes  the better 
instrument  therefore  depends  on the relative  variances  of the money-sup- 
ply and money-demand  disturbances,  aMs and  oiM,  on their covariance, 
and on the relative  interest  elasticities  of money supply and money de- 
mand.21 
Because  the use of reserves  as the policy instrument  at the tactics  level 
further  complicates  the analytics  of the monetary-policy  process-in  that 
it necessitates  working  with  the three-equation  IS-LM-MS  system,  instead 
of the two-equation  IS-LM system-the  next section of the paper  pro- 
ceeds on the assumption  that the Open  Market  Committee  (as is its cur- 
rent  practice)  instead  uses  the  interest  rate  for this  purpose.22 
An Analysis  of the Intermediate-Target  Procedure 
The two-equation  IS-LM  model in the previous  section  illustrates  in a 
straightforward  way the fundamentally  dynamic  nature  of the intermedi- 
ate-target  procedure  for monetary-policy  operations.  The model shows 
20.  James L. Pierce and Thomas D. Thomson, "Some Issues in Controlling the 
Stock of Money," in Controlling  Monetary Aggregates  II: The Implementation,  Pro- 
ceedings of  a Conference (Federal Reserve Bank of  Boston, 1972),  pp.  115-36. 
Subsequently, a  growing literature on  this subject has developed, mostly due to 
Federal  Reserve  staff researchers. 
21.  Once again, a "combination"  policy involving both reserves and the interest 
rate is possible. 
22. Since the empirical work presented below considers both alternatives, how- 
ever, an appendix  available from either the editors or the author briefly  summarizes 
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immediately  that,  in the nondynamic  context  developed  above,  there  is no 
operational  distinction  between using the interest  rate to influence  the 
money  stock  so as in turn  to influence  income  and  simply  usingr  the interest 
rate directly  to influence  income. Solving the model's implied reduced- 
form equation  for the money stock, to find that value of the interest  rate 
that  equates  the expectation  of the money stock to the optimal  M* under 
the money-stock  strategy,  shows  that this value  is identical  to the optimal 
r* under  the  interest-rate  strategy, 
(10)  r  =  (Yt-  O'z). 
Under either  approach  the money stock is an endogenous  variable  with 
expectation  M*, but in the nondynamic  context  this expectation  is of no 
further  significance. 
THE  USEFULNESS  OF  THE  PROCEDURE 
The key to the usefulness  of the money stock (or any other  variable) 
as an intermediate  target  emerges  only in the context  of a dynamic  model 
-and,  in particular,  under  the condition  of some asymmetry  in the flow 
of information  to the policymaker.  Three simple examples of such an 
asymmetry,  each  of which  recalls  some aspect  of the actual  circumstances 
of monetary  policymaking,  illustrate  the concept of the intermediate- 
target  approach.23 
Example 1-Continuous  Monitoring. First, suppose that Yt, Mt, and 
rt refer to the average  levels of the corresponding  economic variables 
within  a given  calendar  quarter.  Further  suppose  that, as of the beginning 
of any quarter  t, the Open Market  Committee  has no information  sug- 
gesting  nonzero  expectations  for either  the IS curve  disturbance  uirt or the 
LM curve disturbance  uLMt.  Then the committee's  optimal policy is 
simply rt' as in equation 10, which in turn implies E(Yt) =  Yt and 
E(Mt)  =  M*. 
To introduce  the necessary  asymmetry  in the information  flow, next 
suppose  that as the quarter  proceeds  the committee  receives  monthly  (or 
23. The structure  of each of these examples follows my earlier paper, "Targets, 
Instruments  and Indicators of Monetary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, 
vol. 1 (October 1975), pp. 443-73. In addition,  the first example,  based on continuous 
monitoring, draws on John H. Kareken,  Thomas Muench, and Neil Wallace, "Opti- 
mal Open Market  Strategy:  The Use of Information  Variables,"  American  Economic 
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even  weekly  or daily) observations  of the  money  stock  but not of income.24 
After one month,  therefore,  it may learn  that the money stock is instead 
turning  out to equal some value Mt #  M*. Income  may also be turning 
out to equal some value Yt:#  Y*, but the committee  has no direct in- 
formation  that  such  is the case. 
The essence of the intermediate-target  approach  to monetary  policy 
under  such circumstances  is for the committee  to act as if its objective 
were to make  the money stock meet, as closely as possible,  the expecta- 
tion M* which  prior  analysis  has shown  to be consistent  with the expec- 
tation of income equaling  the desired Yt. To carry  over the quadratic 
criterion,  the intermediate-target  procedure  consists  of setting  policy as if 
the minimand  were E(Mt  -  M*)2  rather  than E(Yt  -  Y*)2.  Since the 
ultimate  target  of policy in this simplified  model is income, the nomen- 
clature  "intermediate  target"  distinguishes  the role of the money stock 
as  that  of a means  to an  end  rather  than  an end  in itself. 
This strategy  is useful  because  the actual  evolution  of the money  stock 
during  the quarter,  for the given  interest  rate  r*, follows  from  the relevant 
reduced-form  equation  of the IS-LM  model  as 
(11)  Mt  =  Mt  +  ULMt  +  blust, 
so that a deviation  of the money  stock  from expectation  M* is in general 
due, at least  in part,  to a disturbance  in the economy's  spending  behavior. 
If the committee  could also monitor  income  within  the quarter,  so that it 
could get a direct indication of the emergence of a disturbance cyt  0', 
then the optimal  policy after  one month of the quarter  would be not to 
continue  r* as in equation  10 but instead  to implement  a revised  policy 
that  follows  from solving  out the reduced  form  3-that  is, the IS curve  in 
this  simple  model-as 
(12)  r**  =  [*-  O'Zt  - 
E..(Eyt)]  =  * 
=  rt-  a,'Em(uTst), 
where  E. ()  indicates  the expectation  conditional  on the new informa- 
tion received  during  the first  month  of the quarter.  Information  indicating 
a random  surge  in spending  therefore  leads to an increase  in the appro- 
priate interest rate, while information  indicating  a shortfall  leads to a 
24.  The committee presumably can observe the interest rate too; but, since it is 
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reduction.  A similar  adjustment  process would obtain after the second 
month  of the quarter-or after  any  within-quarter  observation  of income. 
Since  the committee  cannot  directly  monitor  income  within  the quarter, 
however,  it cannot  directly  implement  the revised  optimal  interest  rate r*  * 
in equation  12. By contrast,  since the money stock is observable  within 
the quarter,  the committee  can adjust  the interest  rate so as to bring  the 
money  stock  as close as possible  to the previously  selected  M *  -that  is, it 
can  treat  the money  stock  as its intermediate  target  variable.  To the extent 
that  the emerging  difference  between  M, and  M", indicated  by the within- 
quarter  observation,  is due to a disturbance  in spending  behavior-as 
equation  11 shows that in general  it will be, at least in part-the  inter- 
mediate-target  procedure  based on the money stock is therefore  equiva- 
lent to a particular  way of using incoming  money-stock  observations  to 
infer  information  about  the disturbance  u,st and  then  adjusting  the imple- 
mented  policy  on the  basis  of that  information. 
Example  2-Data  Lags. As a second  illustration  of the role of an in- 
formation  asymmetry  in lending  operational  content  to the intermediate- 
target  approach,  suppose  that the Open Market  Committee  observes  all 
variables  only once per quarter,  just at the quarter's  end.  Further  suppose 
that, while each quarter's  value of the money stock is observable at 
the end of that same quarter,  income  is observable  only after  a lag of at 
least one quarter.  Given this asymmetry,  a generalization  of the IS-LM 
model that again illustrates  the essential features of the intermediate- 
target  procedure  is to assume  that the respective  disturbances  of the two 
behavioral  equations  are  serially  correlated: 
(13)  Urst =  Prs(urs,t-)  +  Vrst 
ULMt  =  PLM(ULM,t-1)  +  VLMt, 
where-  1 <  PISMPLM  <  1, and v,g and VLM both have zero mean, finite 
variance,  and  zero  serial  correlation. 
As of the beginning  of quarter  t, then, when the committee  must de- 
termine  and implement  the optimal  interest  rate, M,-l is known  but Yt,l 
is not. Since the committee  therefore  cannot compare  the actual Yt, 
against  the prior  expectation  Y*, to solve out the spending  disturbance 
UIS, t-l  it cannot simply apply the serial-correlation  structure  p,  to de- 
termine directly  a nonzero expectation  to use in selecting the optimal 
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(14)  r**  -=  G-[Y*-  O'zt  -  Ey.1(.Eyt)] 
=  r* -a,  Eys-Orst) 
where  r  is again  as in equation  10 and Ey  ()  indicates  the expecta- 
tion conditional  on the (nonexistent) observation  of income  in the pre- 
vious  quarter.25  By contrast,  what  is possible  under  these  circumstances  is 
to use the indirect  serial  correlation  of (M -M*)  to infer a nonzero  ex- 
pectation of the current (Mt  -  M*)  from the observed  (Mt,  -  M*,) 
according  to 
(15)  EMT  1(Mt -  M*)  =  pM(Mt-1  l) 
where  EMt_  ()  indicates  the expectation  conditional  on the observation 
of the money  stock in the previous  quarter,  and pM  is the "serial-correla- 
tion coefficient"  calculated  from the history  of surprises  in the observed 
money  stock (M -  M*). While  the committee  cannot  directly  implement 
the revised  optimal  interest  rate r** in equation  14, therefore,  it can use 
the expectation  in 15 to set the interest  rate  for quarter  t at the level that 
will bring  the money  stock as close as possible  to the previously  selected 
M,; that  is, it can  treat  the money  stock  as its intermediate  target  variable. 
To the extent that the observed  difference  between  Mt-, and Mtl  was 
due to a disturbance  in spending  behavior-as  equation 11 lagged one 
quarter  shows  that  in general  it will be, at least  in part-the  intermediate- 
target  procedure  based on the money stock is therefore  equivalent  to a 
particular  way of  using the available money-stock observation  from 
quarter  t-  1 to infer  information  about  the disturbance  u,1t and then ad- 
justing  policy  for quarter  t accordingly. 
Example  3-Structural Lags.  As a final  illustration  of the  intermediate- 
target  procedure  in the context of an information  asymmetry,  suppose, 
first, that the interest rate (as well as the other exogenous variables) 
affects  spending  behavior  only after a one-quarter  lag and, second, that 
people hold money  balances  in anticipation  of future  spending.  Hence it 
is always  too late  for monetary  policy  to have any  impact  on income  in the 
25. The committee does, however, have the observation Yt-T,  which permits 
solving for UIS,tT, for some data lag of T quarters,  and this information  too is useful. 
For an analysis of the relative value of this information, see my "Targets,  Instru- 
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current  quarter,  so that  the focus of monetary  policy is on future  income. 
Rewriting  the IS-LM  model  accordingly  yields 
(1')  Yt+1  =  airt +  a'zt +  UIs,t+l 
(2')  Mt  =  b1Yt+1  +  b2rt  +  b'zt +  ULMt. 
Further  suppose  that  the IS and  LM disturbances  are  again  serially  corre- 
lated as in equation  13, and  that  the value  of both income  and  the money 
stock  in each quarter  is observable  just at the end of the quarter  with no 
lag. 
The Open  Market  Committee's  objective  in this situation  is to set the 
interest  rate, during  quarter  t, so as to minimize  the quadratic  criterion 
E(Yt+l  -  Y  I)2.  Given only the knowledge of the model and the exoge- 
nous  variables  as before,  the optimal  policy follows, analogously  to equa- 
tion 10, as 
(10')  r*  =  -'(Y1  -  O'Zt). 
At the beginning  of quarter  t, Mt-, is known  but of course  Yt is not. Hence 
again  the committee  cannot  directly  discover  the current  quarter's  spend- 
ing disturbance  u,,t so that  they  can use it together  with  the serial-correla- 
tion structure  pIS  to calculate  the optimal  interest  rate  according  to 
(14')  rt=  r*-a,  Ey(uIs,t+1), 
where  r* is as in equation  10 and  Et(t)  indicates  the expectation  condi- 
tional  on the (nonexistent)  observation  of Yt.26 
What  is possible,  as in the analogous  example  of the data  lag, is to use 
the indirect  serial correlation  of (M -  M*)  to infer a nonzero  expecta- 
tion of the current  (Mt -  M*) from the observed  money-stock  surprise 
(Mt, l-  M*l)  according to equation 15, and then to use that expectation 
to set the interest  rate  for quarter  t so as to bring  the money  stock as close 
as possible  to the previously  selected  M*; that  is, once again  the commit- 
tee can treat  the money stock as an intermediate  target  variable.  To the 
extent  that the observed  difference  between  Mt-, and Mt:  was due to a 
disturbance  (of course,  unobservable)  in the current  quarter's  spending 
behavior-as the analog  to equation  11 derived  from 1' and  2' shows  that 
in general  it will be, at least in part-the  intermediate-target  procedure 
based on the money stock is equivalent  to a particular  way of using the 
26. Once again, the committee does have the observation Yt-1; see note 25. Benjamin  M. Friedman  311 
money-stock  observation  from  quarter  t  -  1 to infer  information  about  the 
disturbance  uI,S,+1 and then adjusting  policy for quarter  t accordingly. 
As all three of these simple illustrations  show, a policy procedure 
focusing  on an intermediate  target  variable  is a logically  definable  con- 
cept with operational  content  in a dynamic  stochastic  world with some 
source  of asymmetry  in the flow of new information.  This rendering  is 
fully consistent  with the earlier definition  by Karl Brunner  and Allan 
Meltzer  of an intermediate-target  procedure  as a means  of choosing  op- 
timal  monetary  policy under  conditions  of uncertainty  and delays in the 
receipt  of information  about  the ultimate  policy targets.27  That the inter- 
mediate-target  procedure  can be of benefit  in policymaking  under  these 
conditions  is clear. Whether  it will necessarily be of benefit  and whether 
it constitutes  the best operating  procedure  under  actual  operating  condi- 
tions  remain  to be discovered. 
THE  INEFFICIENCY  OF  THE 
INTERMEDIATE-TARGET  PROCEDURE 
As the discussion  above  makes  clear,  the basic usefulness  of the inter- 
mediate-target  approach  to monetary  policymaking  is as a processor  of 
information.  Only observations  of endogenous  variables  that differ  from 
prior  expectations  can provide  new information  in this simplified  setting, 
and the procedure  based on the money stock as an intermediate-target 
variable  amounts  to a specific  way of using  the information  contained  in 
such  observed  differences  in the money  stock.  In particular,  the  intermedi- 
ate-target  procedure  is equivalent  to using this information  first  to draw 
inferences  about  the unobservable  stochastic  disturbance  in the economic 
behavior  proximately  determining  income,  the ultimate  target  of policy, 
and  then  to adjust  monetary  policy in light of those inferences. 
Is the specific  way of processing  this information  embodied  in the 
intermediate-target  approach  the best way? Except under extremely  re- 
strictive  conditions,  the answer  is no. 
In example  1 above (monitoring  of the money stock but not income 
within  the quarter),  the intermediate-target  procedure  amounts  to imple- 
27. Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer, "The  Meaning of Monetary  Indicators," 
in George  Horwich,  ed., Monetary  Process and Policy: A Symposium (Irwin, 1967), 
pp. 187-217. Brunner and Meltzer emphasized the asymmetry due to more rapid 
. collection  of data on financial  variables,  as in examples 1 and 2; as example 3 shows, 
however,  the data-lag  and structural-lag  asymmetries  are analytically equivalent. 312  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
menting,  in place of the policy indicated  in equation 12 based on the 
missing  direct  expectation  of u,,,, the alternative  policy 
(16)  r**  =  r*  - 
V-(Mn-M*)- 
where &  is the coefficient  of the interest  rate in the solved-out  reduced- 
form  equation  for the money  stock  in the IS-LM  model,  and  Mm,  is the ob- 
servation  of the money  stock after  the first  month  of the quarter.28  Given 
that the ultimate  target  of monetary  policy is income and not the money 
stock,  using  policy 16 in place of policy 12 in turn  implies  an assumption 
that the information  contained  in the observed  (Mm  -  M*) carries  over 
directly  to the crucial  spending  disturbance  UIFt.  In particular,  equating 
the right-hand  sides of equations  12 and 16 shows, after  substituting  for 
the two reduced-form  coefficients  0 and f, that the intermediate-target 
approach  processes  this information  to derive  the relevant  expectation  as 
(17)  Emn(urst)  =  (alb1 +  b2)-la(Mm -  M*). 
Is this expression  the best available  estimate  of the missing  expecta- 
tion for the IS curve  disturbance?  As equation  11 indicates,  the money- 
stock surprise  (Mm  -  M*) consists  of a combination  of both the IS and 
LM disturbances,  with the former  weighted  by the income elasticity  of 
money demand. Given this composite nature of  (Mm -  M*),  it follows 
that  the correct  minimum-variance  expression  for the missing  expectation 
is not equation  17 but  instead 
(18)  Em(uIst) 
-  (aIM  +  2b1015s,Lm +  b  22s)1(b  1Cs  +  aIS,  LM)(Mm  -  M*). 
Under  the restrictive  conditions  that aLv =  aY,LM  =  0  (that is, money 
demand  is perfectly  stable) and  b2 =  0 (money  demand  is perfectly  inter- 
est inelastic), the two methods  of inferring  the disturbance  in spending 
behavior  from the observed money surprise  are identical, so that the 
policy embodied  in equation 16 implemented  under the intermediate- 
target  approach  is identical  to the correct  optimal  policy  indicated  by sub- 
28. If the money stock is supposed to be growing during the quarter, then the 
correct  right-hand-side  variable  in  16  is  not  (Mm -  M,)  but  (Mm -  M*),  where 
M  is the first-month  average money stock that some subsidiary relation indicates 
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stituting  the correct  expectation  18 into 12.29 In the absence  of perfect 
stability  and interest  inelasticity  of money demand,  however,  the expec- 
tations  in 17 and 18 in general  are not identical,  so that  the policy  imple- 
mented  under  the intermediate-target  procedure  is inferior  to the optimal 
policy  given  by combining  12 and 18. 
The intuitive  appeal  of this result  is straightforward.  As the discussion 
above of the merits  of the intermediate-target  procedure  demonstrates, 
the procedure  is useful  to the extent  that  the emerging  difference  between 
Mt and  M* is due to the (as yet unobserved)  spending  disturbance  uM,. 
If money demand  is perfectly  stable, then in the simple IS-LM model 
u,,t  0  O  is the only reason  for observing  M, =# M*, so that  the procedure 
reduces  to using  the observed  money  surprise,  divided  by the income  elas- 
ticity  of money  demand,  to infer  the key expectation  of u,,,.  In addition, 
if money  demand  is perfectly  interest  inelastic,  there  is no need to allow 
for the slope of the LM curve  in adjusting  policy so as to offset  this cor- 
rectly inferred  expectation.  If money demand includes stochastic dis- 
turbances  or is interest  elastic, however,  then the inference-and-adjust- 
ment  mechanism  implied  by the intermediate-target  procedure  does not 
in general  constitute  the best way of using the information  contained  in 
the observed  money surprise.  In particular,  the optimal  policy consists 
of first  determining  how much  of the money  surprise  is likely  to be due to 
a spending  disturbance  (thereby  warranting  an offsetting  policy action) 
and then allowing  for the slope of the LM curve in gauging  the proper 
offsetting  policy. 
The same conclusion  also follows for example  2 (the data lag in ob- 
serving  income) and the directly analogous  example 3  (the structural 
lags). In place of the policy  in equation  14 based  on the missing  observa- 
tion of Ytl,, for example,  the intermediate-target  procedure  in this situa- 
tion amounts  to implementing  the alternative  policy 
(19)  r**  =  r*-  1I1EMt 1(M  t-M*) 
=  rt*  -  pM(Mt-1  Me*  1), 
where  the relevant  expectation  is from equation  15. Using policy 19 in 
place of 14 is in turn  equivalent,  upon substitution  for the indirect  serial- 
correlation  coefficient  p,, to processing  the information  contained  in the 
observed  money surprise  from the previous  quarter  so as to derive the 
29.  If the money stock is continuously observable and the interest rate continu- 
ously adjustable,  the correct optimal policy is equivalent to Poole's "combination 
policy";  see Poole, "Optimal  Choice of Monetary  Policy Instruments." 314  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
associated  expectation  of the disturbance  in spending  behavior  in the 
current  quarter  according  to 
(20)  EMt_l(uIst)  =  (alb1  +  b2)-'al(aM  +  2blcIs,  LM +  b  1)-' 
X  [PLMTLM  +  bi(pl5 +  pLM)oIS,LA  +  bip sI-2s](Mti  - 
when, by contrast,  the correct  expression  for the missing  expectation  is 
the simpler30 
(21)  EMt_l(uIst)  =  (LM  +  2bloIs,LM  +  bsI )I 
X (b  pIISIS  +  PISOIS,LM)(Mt-1  -  Mt-1). 
Once again, only under the restrictive  conditions that the money- 
demand  function is perfectly  stable and perfectly  interest  inelastic are 
the two methods of inferring  the relevant  expectation-and hence the 
two policies-necessarily identical. Conversely,  if the demand of the 
nonbank  public  for money  balances  includes  stochastic  disturbances  or is 
interest  elastic, then by following the intermediate-target  approach  the 
Open Market  Committee  in general  is not optimally  exploiting  the in- 
formation  contained  in observations  of the  money  stock. 
Hence  the intermediate-target  procedure  for monetary  policy  is a useful 
information  processor but in  general an inefficient one  in  that its 
inference-and-adjustment  mechanism  is not, except  under  highly  restric- 
tive conditions, the best way to exploit the information  contained  in 
money-stock  observations.  The third section of the paper uses a some- 
what generalized  econometric  IS-LM model to provide some empirical 
sense  of the extent  of this  inefficiency. 
A  SECOND  INEFFICIENCY  OF  THE  PROCEDURE 
What about information  from sources other than the money stock? 
Not  only does the intermediate-target  procedure  fail to process effi- 
ciently  the information  contained  in observations  of the money stock, it 
also excludes from the policy-adjustment  process any information  not 
contained  in such observations.  Since information  is (by definition)  the 
scarce  resource  in models  of policy formulation  under  uncertainty,  it can 
hardly  be optimal  to disregard  available  information  simply  because it 
30. This expression uses only the information contained in (Mt-  -  M* .)  and 
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originates  from a source other than the single variable  selected as the 
intermediate  target. 
It is important  in this context  to distinguish  between  two applications 
of new information  under  the intermediate-target  procedure:  first,  using 
new information  to select a new monetary  target  M* that is more likely 
to be consistent  with  the desired  income  target  Y*; and,  second,  using  new 
information  to determine  how to manipulate  the interest  rate so as to 
achieve  the original  M* as closely as possible.  In the extreme  world  of a 
constant-monetary-growth  rule, in which the central  bank would never 
change  the setting  of the intermediate-target  variable,  the only use that 
monetary  policy would make of new information  is in the latter  sense of 
continually adjusting  its instrument(s) to  maximize the precision of 
monetary  control around the fixed growth path. No new information 
would alter the monetary policymakers'  views about the relationship 
between  income,  or other  ultimate  targets  of policy, and money. (At the 
other extreme,  if the central  bank changed  the setting of its monetary 
target  every  time it received  new information  and  therefore  was prepared 
to change  its instrument  setting,  then it would not have an intermediate 
target  in any  operational  sense.) 
At least  in the United  States,  however,  the Federal  Reserve  System  has 
not adopted  a rule  of constant  monetary  growth.  Instead,  as the  discussion 
in the first section explains,  once each quarter  the Open Market Com- 
mittee selects the targeted  rate of monetary  growth (which, given the 
past quarter's  observation  Mt1, is equivalent  to target  M*). At least in 
principle,  therefore,  the committee  takes advantage  once a quarter  of the 
opportunity  to reassess the money-income  relationship  and determine 
what  M* value  is consistent  with  achieving  its ultimate  objectives.  Conse- 
quently,  it is only the within-quarter  flow of new information  that the 
intermediate-target  procedure  necessarily  precludes  the committee  from 
exploiting. 
The discussion  above frames  the intermediate-target  procedure  in the 
context  of the simple  IS-LM  model and shows that the procedure  is in- 
efficient  in failing to allow adequately  for the composite  nature  of sur- 
prises  in observed  movements  of the money stock, so that policy acts to 
offset all such surprises  regardless  of their source.  Because of its highly 
simplified  structure,  the IS-LM model contains no additional  source, 
beyond  observations  of the money  stock  itself, of information  pertinent  to 
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cated world in which  monetary  policy actually  operates,  however,  what 
clues are available  to help the committee  determine  why the observed 
money stock is deviating  from the targeted  path, so that it will know 
whether  or not to offset the deviation?  Further,  since this more compli- 
cated world contains  more than one source of income variation,  what 
additional  clues are available  to help the committee  directly anticipate 
disturbances  to income? 
Since the relevant  criterion  here is the practical  rather  than the theo- 
retical  usefulness  of information,  these questions  are answerable  only at 
the empirical  level. Nevertheless,  it is possible  to suggest  a priori  at least 
three  realms,  progressively  further  removed  from the direct  operation  of 
monetary  policy,  in which  to look for such  information. 
First, the Federal Reserve collects from the banking  system a vast 
amount  of data  beyond  money-stock  observations.  The discussion  in the 
first section, for example, has introduced  an equation,  9, representing 
banks'  portfolio  behavior,  based on reserves  and the interest  rate, which 
determines  money supply.  When the Open Market  Committee  uses the 
federal  funds rate as its policy instrument,  this bank-behavior  relation- 
ship determines  the stock of reserves  as a further  endogenous  variable.81 
Since  money,  reserves,  and  the interest  rate  can all be conveniently  moni- 
tored  within  the quarter,  the emerging  reserves  surprise  may  be of further 
use. In particular,  since it is possible to compute the bank-behavior 
disturbance  ums directly  from  M, R, and  r, knowing  this disturbance  may 
augments  useful  information  unless  the associated  covariances  ris,  ms and 
a9LM,Is  are both zero; and so may knowing  other easily available  data on 
the banking  system  and  other  financial  aggregates.  Empirical  results  based 
on "semi-reduced-form"  regressions  of  nominal income (not  shown 
here) indicate  that several  nonmonetary  financial  aggregates-including 
bank credit, bank loans, total credit, and total liquid assets, each of 
which  is readily  observable  on a current  basis,  just  like the money  stock- 
contain information  about income that is not already  contained  in the 
monetary  aggregates.32  The fact that monetary  policy cannot  exert even 
31.  Similarly,  when the committee uses reserves  as its instrument,  the addition  of 
equation 9 enables the IS-LM-MS  model to determine  the interest  rate endogenously. 
32. These regressions,  estimated with quarterly  seasonally adjusted  data for the 
United States for the  1961:1-1976:2  sample period, follow the St. Louis pattern. 
Tests based on the F statistic show, usually at the 99 percent confidence level, that 
these nonmonetary aggregates,  either singly or in pairs, provide additional explana- 
tory power in equations that already include federal high-employment  expenditures 
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reasonably  close short-run  control  over some of these aggregates  (espe- 
cially total credit  and total liquid assets) as intermediate-target  variables 
in no way precludes  their use as "information"  variables. 
Second,  the notion of "the"  interest  rate  inherent  in the IS-LM  model 
is clearly  an artifice  in a world  of multiple  assets.  Even as a first  approxi- 
mation,  the interest  rate  that  presumably  matters  most  for money  demand 
is a short-term  yield,  while  the interest  rate  that  matters  most  for spending 
is a long-term  yield (or complex of yields) that, for a given short-term 
yield, follows from  economic  behavior  in the asset markets.  A stochastic 
disturbance  in the relevant  asset-market  behavior  will contribute  directly 
both to a deviation  of income  from Y* and to a deviation  of the money 
stock  from  M* (though not in identical  ways); and, conversely,  distur- 
bances  in spending  behavior  will also  be reflected  in developments  in asset 
markets.  Since both disturbances  are in part reflected  in readily  observ- 
able interest-rate  and equity-price  relationships,  observed patterns of 
asset  prices  and  yields,  as well as other  financial-market  measures  beyond 
the banking-sector  variables, can provide further information  useful 
either  for resolving  the compound  nature  of money  surprises  or for form- 
ing independent  expectations  about  income disturbances. 
Third,  while income  in the sense of gross national  product  is observ- 
able only once a quarter,33  a great many sources of directly pertinent 
nonfinancial  data are available  more frequently:  personal  income,  labor 
force  and  employment,  wholesale  and  consumer  prices,  industrial  produc- 
tion, retail sales, business  inventories,  housing starts, automobile  sales, 
and  many  more.  These variables,  too, can help determine  why the money 
stock is evolving differently  from expectations-thereby indicating  how 
monetary  policy should  react-and  can also help provide  direct  estimates 
of the  relevant  income  disturbance. 
In principle,  any of these  three  kinds  of variables  can serve  as such an 
"information  variable";  indeed, the discussion  above demonstrates  that 
an intermediate-target  variable  is merely  a special  case of the more gen- 
eral use of one or more such information  variables.3'  An unfortunate 
consequence  of the Open Market Committee's  desire to have not just 
information  variables  but intermediate  targets, however, is that it has 
led to an emphasis  on "controllability"  which has little to do with the 
33. Even so, the Commerce Department regularly revises the national income 
and product accounts between its new quarterly  estimates. 
34.  See Kareken and others, "Optimal Open Market Strategy," for a detailed 
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underlying  purpose  of the intermediate-target  approach  as a processor  of 
information.  Although any readily observable  variable  reliably related 
to the ultimate  targets  of policy is a useful information  variable,  only 
variables  over  which  the committee  can  exert  fairly  close control  represent 
plausible candidates  as intermediate  targets;35  and the pursuit of the 
intermediate-target  approach  hinders  the exploitation  of the remaining 
potential  information  variables  that  are  not intermediate  targets. 
Hence the intermediate-target  procedure  based on the money stock is 
also inefficient  in that  it fails to exploit  fully the information  contained  in 
observations  of variables other than the intermediate  target itself. It 
may  well be true  that the money  stock  is a highly  important  source  of in- 
formation  about likely outcomes for the ultimate targets of monetary 
policy; it is even possible that it is the best such source. Nevertheless, 
that the money stock is the only practically  exploitable  source of this 
information,  or that it already  contains all information  available  from 
other  sources,  is highly  implausible. 
Evaluating  the Inefficiency  of the Intermediate-Target  Procedure 
The discussion  in the previous  section shows at the conceptual  level 
that the intermediate-target  procedure  for monetary  policy, based  on the 
money  stock,  is in general  an inefficient  means  of processing  the informa- 
tion contained  in observations  of the money stock.36  How important  is 
this  inefficiency  in practice? 
35. The greater "endogeneity"  of bank credit since the removal in 1970 of the 
Regulation Q ceiling on interest paid on large certificates  of deposit, for example, is 
sometimes cited as a reason for preferring  money as the intermediate  target. Since 
mid-1970, the observed correlations between nominal income and almost any mea- 
sure of bank credit have increased  dramatically,  while the corresponding  correlations 
between bank-credit  measures and money have fallen; see David E. Lindsey, "The 
Relationship of GNP to Various Money and Credit Aggregates" (Board of Gover- 
nors of the Federal Reserve System, October 1976; processed), table 5. As the dis- 
cussion above makes clear, however, such endogeneity in no way disqualifies an 
information  variable for purposes of short-run  monetary policy. 
36. I am grateful to Franco Modigliani for many extremely helpful conversa- 
tions about the construction  of this model. For reasons that are apparent  in the dis- 
cussion below, I have come to refer to the model (once the nominal-income  identity 
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A  SMALL  MACROECONOMETRIC  MODEL 
As a comparison  of the alternative  expectations  17 and 18-or,  analo- 
gously, 20 and 21-shows,  the extent of this inefficiency  is an empirical 
matter  which depends  on the economy's  underlying  stochastic  features, 
including  the relevant  variance-covariance  and serial-correlation  struc- 
tures, as well as on some of the deterministic  aspects of economic  be- 
havior.  Evaluating  this inefficiency,  therefore,  calls for some convenient 
empirical  model. The five-equation  macroeconometric  model of  the 
United  States  developed  for this  purpose  here  is a "bare  essentials"  model, 
in the sense  that it is impossible  to reduce  it to fewer  variables  and equa- 
tions without  grossly  distorting  fundamental  notions of macroeconomic 
behavior.  The model expands  on the two-equation  IS-LM model used 
throughout  the first  two sections  of the paper  in three  respects:  First,  the 
model  resolves  the ambiguity  of real-dollar  versus  nominal-dollar  magni- 
tudes by expressing  the "income"  variable  in the IS curve  in real terms 
and adding  a separate  price-setting  equation,  leaving  nominal  income to 
be determined  by the appropriate  identity  relation.  Second,  the model in- 
cludes an equation  for bank-portfolio  behavior  comparable  to equation 
9,  thereby facilitating  the analysis of monetary  policy also under the 
assumption  that the Open Market Committee  adopts the stock of re- 
serves as its policy instrument.  Third, as the discussion  in the second 
section anticipates,  the model identifies  "the"  interest  rate most relevant 
for behavior  of money demand  and money supply as a short-term  rate 
and "the"  interest  rate most relevant  for behavior  of spending  as a long- 
term  rate,  and  adds  a simple  term-structure  equation  relating  the two.37 
It is of the utmost  importance  to emphasize  that, in the construction 
of this macroeconometric  model for purposes  of this paper,  the primary 
objectives  have  been compactness  and  simplicity  in the interest  of analyti- 
cal tractability  and  easy  understanding.  The model  has only  five  stochastic 
equations  (IS curve, price setting,  LM curve, money supply, and term 
structure),  hence five endogenous  variables;  and, apart  from the auto- 
regressive  terms,  only four exogenous  variables-one each for monetary 
37. It is only with great reluctance,  in the interest  of preserving  the model's com- 
pactness, that I have used a term-structure  equation in place of a pair of supply and 
demand equations for long-term assets, comparable to the LM and MS equations; 
see my "Financial  Flow Variables and the Short-Run  Determination of Long-Term 
Interest Rates," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85 (August 1977), pp. 661-89. 320  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
policy, fiscal  policy,  and  debt-management  policy, and  one for the foreign 
sector. All of the economic  relationships  included  in the model are of 
the most familiar,  fundamental  sort. No variable  appears  explicitly in 
the model lagged  more  than one quarter,  so that all lag structures  are of 
the implicit  Koyck form.38 All of the equations  are linear in the loga- 
rithms  of the economic  variables. 
In the absence  of the extensive  disaggregation,  elaborate  lists of exoge- 
nous variables,  complex  lag structures,  and nonlinear  specifications  that 
characterize  modem large-scale  macroeconometric  modeling,  therefore, 
this model is clearly neither  the latest practical  tool for forecasting  or 
policy planning  nor the most comprehensive  summary  of current  knowl- 
edge of the U.S. economy.  Instead,  the model's  purpose  is to indicate  the 
rough  orders  of magnitude  of the respective  variances,  covariances,  serial 
correlations,  and slope coefficients  corresponding  to those that figure 
prominently  in the previous  section's  analytical  discussion  of the ineffi- 
ciency of the exploitation  by the intermediate-target  approach  of the in- 
formation  contained  in observations  of the money stock. Unlike large- 
scale complex  models, the compact  linear  model yields direct estimates 
of these magnitudes.  Nevertheless,  as the discussion below shows, the 
model  itself is quite  interesting  in a number  of further  respects. 
The model was estimated,  using  seasonally  adjusted  quarterly  data  for 
the United States  over the sample  period 1961:1-1976:2, by (with one 
exception  noted  below) Ray Fair's  limited-information  method  for simul- 
taneous  equations  with  lagged  dependent  variables  and  first-order  serially 
correlated  disturbances.39  Except for the term-structure  equation,  all of 
the model's  specifications  are in first differences  (and hence impose the 
assumption  that  the disturbances  in the corresponding  level specifications 
follow random  walks). All variables  are expressed  in natural  logarithms, 
so that these differences  in turn correspond  to percentage  changes (or 
growth  rates). 
38. Using polynomial distributed-lag  techniques, for example, would probably 
have improved the within-sample  fit of at least several of the equations, since the 
available econometric evidence indicates that some of the lag structures  represented 
in the model are more likely concave from the origin than convex. 
39. Ray C. Fair, "The Estimation  of Simultaneous  Equation Models with Lagged 
Endogenous Variables and First Order Serially Correlated Errors,"  Econometrica, 
vol. 38 (May 1970), pp. 507-16. The precise method used corresponds  to that indi- 
cated in section 4  of  Fair's paper as the correct way of  estimating the model's 
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Since the model includes two alternative  instruments  of monetary 
policy, reserves  and the short-term  interest  rate, it is necessary  for pur- 
poses of the instrumental-variables  estimation  procedure  to designate  the 
one presumed  to have been exogenous during  the sample period. This 
question  is far  from  straightforward  in a quarterly  time  frame,  despite  the 
fact that the Open Market  Committee  has typically  acted so as to set a 
short-term  interest rate over much briefer intervals.  To guard against 
erroneous  conclusions,  therefore,  the model was estimated  twice-once 
with  reserves  treated  as exogenous,  and once with the short-term  interest 
rate  treated  as exogenous.  In fact, the two sets of estimates  did not differ 
in any apparently  interesting  way. The estimates  presented  below and 
subsequently  used to analyze  the intermediate-target  procedure  are those 
for reserves  treated  as exogenous.40 
The estimates  of the model's five behavioral  equations  are given in 
expressions  I through  V, where  the symbols  are defined  as follows: 
E = high-employment  federal  expenditures 
I = price  deflator  for dollar-denominated  imports  (1972 =  1.0) 
L = face amount  of outstanding  federal  securities  maturing 
in more  than  one  year (beginning  of quarter) 
M =  money stock, M2 (currency  plus demand  and time deposits  plus 
certificates  of deposit  under  $100,000) 
P = price  deflator  for  gross  national  product  ( 1972 =  1.0) 
R =  nonborrowed  reserves,  adjusted  for changes  in reserve  require- 
ments, less reserves  required  against government  deposits 
rL,  =  long-term interest rate (Moody's Baa corporate bonds),  in 
percent 
r, =  short-term  interest  rate (three-month  Treasury  bills), in percent 
S =  face amount of outstanding  federal-government  securities  ma- 
turing  in less than  one year (beginning  of quarter) 
X = real  gross  national  product 
Y = nominal  gross  national  product. 
All variables  are expressed  in natural  logarithms,  and, except  for rL,  and 
rs, are seasonally adjusted.  All dollar amounts are expressed  in bil- 
40.  Occasional footnotes along the way indicate the corresponding  results based 
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lions of current  dollars, except E and X, which are in billions of 1972 
dollars.  The numbers  in parentheses  are (asymptotic)  t statistics,  and  R2 
is the adjusted  coefficient  of multiple  determination  of the untransformed 
variables. 
(I)  AXt = 0.00614 +  0.451 AXt_-  +  0.113 AEt 
(3.7)  (4.0)  (2.3) 
-  0.0948  ArLt  -  0.101  AII-1. 
(-2.7)  (-2.9) 
Standard  error =  0.00761;  P2 =  0.63; p  =  -0.373. 
(II)  APt =  0.799  APt_-  +  0.0763  AIt-i +  0.119  AXt_1. 
(17.3)  (4.3)  (4.0) 
Standard  error =  0.00336;  f?2 =  0.86; p  =  -0.345. 
(III)  A(M -  P)t  =  0.692  A(M-  P)e_  +  0.362 AXt  -  0.0512  Arsst. 
(4.3)  (2.3)  (-4.2) 
Standard  error =  0.00617;  P2 =  0.58; p  =  -0.106. 
(IV)  AMt0  .950 AMt-i +  0.0726  ARt  -  0.0165  Arst. 
(25.0)  (2.2)  (-2.4) 
Standard  error =  0.00514; K? =  0.51; p  =  -0.0960. 
(V)  rLt =  0.000546 +  0.902 rL,  t_  +  0.265  rst 
(0.1)  (19.0)  (4.4) 
-  0.137  rs,t-i  +  0.0535  A(L  -S)t_. 
(-2.8)  (1.7) 
Standard  error =  0.0234; RI =  0.97; p =  0.592. 
The nominal income identity is 
(VI)  A Ye--XX  +  APt. 
While  the model is fairly  straightforward,  it is interesting  to comment 
in particular  on a few aspects  of the estimation  results. 
The IS curve,  equation  I, relates  real spending  to federal  expenditures 
measured  on a high-employment  basis, to the dollar-denominated  price 
of U.S. imports  (lagged one quarter),  and to the long-term  interest  rate. 
The equation  also includes  an intercept,  implying  a linear  time trend  in 
the corresponding  equation  for the logarithm  of the level of output;  this 
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growth  in productivity  and the labor force, is 1.1 percent  per quarter.4' 
Given the sample-period  means of high-employment  federal spending 
and total  gross  national  product,  the estimated  spending  elasticity  implies 
fiscal-policy  multipliers  of 0.557 and 1.01 in the short  and long runs,  re- 
spectively. The negative effect of import prices probably reflects the 
wealth-transfer  aspect  of a shift in the terms  of trade,  since the effect  of 
movements  in import prices on producers  could in general be either 
positive  or negative. 
It is worth  noting  explicitly  that the interest  rate used in the IS curve 
here  is a nominal  yield. In principle,  real and nominal  yields should  both 
matter independently  for real spending.  The rationale underlying  the 
role of the real  yield  is simply  the familiar  interest  elasticity  of demand  for 
real  product.  Some  reasons  for expecting  nominal  yields to influence  real 
spending  independently  of the corresponding  real yields include wealth 
effects  associated  with  nominally  denominated  government  (and foreign) 
bonds, distribution  effects associated  with nominally  denominated  pri- 
vate bonds, nonindexed  features of the tax code, the dependence  on 
nominal yields of the effective average  life of fixed-payment  mortgage 
contracts,  and  the effects  of legal ceilings  on specific  nominal  yields. Sev- 
eral attempts  at approximating  an implicit real yield by using simple 
mechanisms  to adjust  for price expectations  were, however,  empirically 
unsuccessful;42  hence  the IS curve  includes  the  nominal  yield  only. 
The price-setting  equation, II, relates prices to dollar-denominated 
import  prices and the level of output,  both lagged  one quarter.  Since the 
domestic  price index used here is the GNP deflator,  which is equivalent 
to a price index for domestic value added, the effect of import prices 
here strictly  reflects  those aspects  of competition  in "tradables"  empha- 
sized  in the recent  literature;  it is therefore  a stronger  result  than  the now 
familiar  effect  of import  prices  on indexes,  like the consumer  price  index, 
41.  Throughout  this section, logarithmic  differences,  multiplied  by 100, are inter- 
preted as quarterly  growth rates. 
42.  In principle, this finding is  consistent, on one interpretation,  with Fama's 
argument that the real rate is simply a constant plus a white noise; see Eugene F. 
Fama, "Short-Term  Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation,"  American Economic 
Review, vol. 65 (June 1975), pp. 269-82. It is also consistent,  on another interpreta- 
tion, with the idea that price expectations  move sluggishly  so as to render  movements 
in real and nominal yields highly correlated  in the short run. A more likely explana- 
tion is that the expectations mechanisms used (again no lag structure higher than 
first-order) is just too simple for the purpose, especially given the relatively limited 
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for which  there  is also a direct  input  effect.  Since  both the price  term  and 
the real-output  term  in this equation  are in logarithmic  difference  form, 
this equation  is not a conventional  "Phillips  curve."  Comparing  the fit 
and other  statistics  reveals  little empirical  basis  for choosing  between  this 
specification  and an alternative  in which the rate of change  of prices  de- 
pends  on the  level of output.43 
Especially  in the context  of the a priori  restriction  to simple  specifica- 
tions and lag structures,  the statistical  performance  of both the IS curve 
and  the  price-setting  equation  individually-and the explanation  of move- 
ments  in nominal  income  provided  by the two together-casts doubt on 
the familiar  assertion  that modern  macroeconomics  has discovered  how 
to explain  nominal-income  movements  but not their separation  into real 
and price components.44  The multiple-correlation  coefficient  of the IS 
curve  is of about  the same  magnitude  typically  reported  for equations  of 
the St. Louis style explaining  arithmetic differences  of nominal  income, 
but it is well known  that  logarithmic differences  (which  largely  eliminate 
the time trend) are more difficult  to explain.  The equations  recently  re- 
ported  by Michael  Hamburger,  for example,  explaining  the logarithmic 
difference  of nominal  income using distributed  lags on the logarithmic 
difference  of the money stock (as well as two fiscal variables  with dis- 
tributed  lags and a strike dummy  variable), have A2 =  0.44 when the 
money-stock  variable  is M1 and only A2 =  0.35 when the money-stock 
variable  is M2.45 
The LM curve, equation  III, relates  the demand  for real  balances  (de- 
fined  as M2) to real income and the short-term  interest  rate.46  The point 
43.  The alternative  "Phillips  curve"  result is 
APt  =  0.626  APt-.  +  0.0836  AIt-J  +  0.000421  Xt-1. 
(7.7)  (4.3)  (3-9) 
Standard  error =  0.00333; A2  =  0.85; p = -0.299. 
Adding an intercept  to II results  in a I statistic  of 1.4 for the intercept. 
44.  See, for example, Milton Friedman, "A Monetary Theory of Nominal In- 
come," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 79 (March/April 1971), pp. 323-37. 
45.  Michael J. Hamburger,  "Behavior  of the Money Stock: Is There a Puzzle?" 
Journal  of Monetary  Economics, vol. 3 (July 1977), p. 286. 
46.  In part because of the gross failure of standard  state-of-the-art  equations to 
track M1 during recent years, many academic economists who are enthusiastic  pro- 
ponents of monetary-growth  targets have recently strengthened  their consensus that 
M2 is the right aggregate  for this purpose;  see, for example, William Fellner and Dan 
Larkins, "Interpretation  of  a Regularity in the Behavior of  M2," BPEA, 3:1976, 
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estimate  of the long-run  real-income  elasticity  of money demand  is 1.18, 
but it is not possible  to reject at the 95 percent  confidence  level the hy- 
pothesis of unit long-run elasticity. Since the short-run  elasticities of 
money  demand  with respect  to real income  and  prices are sharply  differ- 
ent, however,  the equation  indicates  that the anticipated  real-price  com- 
position  of desired  growth  in nominal  income  is relevant  for selecting  the 
appropriate  monetary-growth  target.  The point estimate  of the long-run 
interest  elasticity  of money  demand  is -0.167. 
The money-supply equation,  IV, relates  the nominal  money supply  to 
bank  reserves  and the short-term  interest  rate.47  The 1.45 point estimate 
of the long-run  elasticity of money supply with respect to reserves  is 
plausible,  since time deposits (which bear lower reserve  requirements) 
tend to increase  more rapidly  than demand  deposits. By contrast,  the 
estimated  speed of adjustment  is surprisingly  slow; it is consistent,  how- 
ever, with the familiar  notion that the most immediate  impact of an 
open market  operation  is an offsetting  reaction  at the discount  window. 
The negative  response  of money supply  to the short-term  interest  rate is 
even  more  surprising-and inconsistent  with  the conventional  assumption 
as indicated  in equation  9. A plausible  explanation  for this result  is that 
the positive effect of market  yields on money supply, associated  with 
banks'  incentive  to economize  on their  free reserves,  is apparently  domi- 
nated  by the negative  effect  due to banks'  reliance  on nonmoney  liabilities 
like negotiable certificates  of  deposits and Eurodollar  borrowings  to 
finance  credit  expansion. 
These explanations  for both the low estimated  short-run  reserves  elas- 
ticity  and  the negative  estimated  interest-rate  elasticity  of the money  sup- 
ply gain empirical  support  from an alternative  equation  using total re- 
serves in place of nonborrowed  reserves,  which leads to both a larger 
short-run  reserves  elasticity  and a larger  (in absolute  value) interest-rate 
M2, which includes passbook  savings deposits at commercial  banks  but not at mutual 
savings banks or savings and loan associations-and  which also includes about half 
of the large ($100,000 and over) certificates  of deposit issued by commercial banks 
because they are not written to be negotiable-is  most difficult  to relate sensibly to 
any theoretical  concept in monetary  economics. 
47.  For this one equation only, the results reported above are based on single- 
equation estimation rather than on  Fair's simultaneous-equation  procedure. The 
corresponding results based on  Fair's method compound the problem discussed 
below in connection with the reserves variable. The coefficient  estimate for reserves 
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elasticity.  These  differences  are as anticipated,  since  netting  out the effect 
of banks'  borrowing  at the discount  window  not only eliminates  at least 
one  source of  short-run  slippage between reserves management  and 
money but also holds constant  net free reserves (except for the minor 
variation  in excess reserves). Further  support  follows from the fact that 
the same specification  of the money-supply  equation, estimated  using 
M1  instead  of M2,  shows  a positive  interest-rate  effect,  as in conventional 
models.48  In addition,  an alternative  M2-supply  equation  which includes 
an intercept  term and constrains  the long-run  reserves  elasticity  to unity 
again  reproduces  the  negative  interest-rate  effect.49 
The term-structure  equation,  V, relates the long-term  interest  rate to 
the current  level and most recent history  of the short-term  interest  rate 
and to shifts in the maturity  composition  of outstanding  federal debt. 
Since the equation  is in level form, it also includes  an intercept,  but the 
estimated  value  is not significantly  different  from  zero.  The point  estimate 
of the long-run  elasticity  of the long-term  interest  rate  with  respect  to the 
short-term  interest  rate is 1.31, but it is impossible  to reject at the 95 
percent confidence  level the hypothesis  of unit elasticity-which, after 
deletion of the intercept,  implies  that the two yields are identical  in the 
long run (apart from any ongoing  effects  of the debt-management  vari- 
able). Given the sample-period  mean of the long-term  interest  rate, the 
0.0234 logarithmic  standard  error  is equivalent  to an absolute  standard 
error  of 16 basis  points. 
For the purposes of short-run  analysis, the model is a straightfor- 
ward five-equation  system in five endogenous  variables  including  real 
income, prices, the money stock, the long-term  interest  rate, and either 
the short-term  interest  rate or the stock of reserves,  whichever  the Open 
Market  Committee  does not select as the exogenous  instrument  of mone- 
tary policy.50  In addition,  the identity  determines  nominal  income as a 
sixth  endogenous  variable. 
Although  the primary  motive behind the construction  of this simple 
48.  The MPS model, which determines  both M1 and M2 as endogenous  variables, 
does not show a negative interest-rate  effect on M2 because it treats as exogenous the 
amount of reserves held against time deposits. 
49.  The finding of a negative interest-rate  effect on money supply is independent 
of  the estimation method used. With Fair's simultaneous-equations  procedure, the 
estimated coefficient  on the interest rate in IV is -0.0377  with a t statistic of -2.5. 
50. It would, in principle, be possible to close the model completely in this re- 
spect by also constructing  a sixth equation for the endogenous  behavior  of monetary 
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model is its application  to short-run  analysis  of monetary  policy, its im- 
plied steady-state  growth-equilibrium  properties  are also of  interest. 
Since equations  I-IV  are specified  in terms of logarithmic  differences, 
while the term-structure  equation  V is in logarithmic  levels (except for 
the debt-management  variable), in long-run  equilibrium  the model de- 
composes  into  two blocks  so that  the variables  in I-IV are  independent  of 
the (nominal)  interest  rates. 
Two alternative  long-run  interpretations  of equations  I-IV are possi- 
ble, corresponding  to  alternative  assumptions  about the relevant ex- 
change-rate  regime.  First, if the Federal Reserve fixes the equilibrium 
growth  rate of reserves,  the money-supply  equation  IV determines  the 
equilibrium  growth  rate of the nominal money stock which, given the 
equilibrium  growth  rate of real output  from the IS curve (equation  I), 
determines  the equilibrium  rate  of price  inflation  via the LM curve (equa- 
tion III). Then equation  II determines  the equilibrium  rate of change  of 
dollar-denominated  import  prices which-for  fixed real terms  of trade, 
and given the already  determined  domestic  inflation  rate-is  equivalent 
to determining  the equilibrium  appreciation  or depreciation  of the dollar. 
Alternatively,  if the Federal  Reserve  fixes  the exchange  rate,  II determines 
the equilibrium  rate of domestic  inflation  which, again given the equi- 
librium  real  growth  rate  from  I, determines  the equilibrium  rate  of mone- 
tary  growth  via III; and  now IV determines  the equilibrium  growth  rate  of 
reserves. 
A key distinction  between  the model's  short-  and  long-run  implications, 
therefore,  concerns  the roles of the exchange  rate and of the stock of re- 
serves.  In the short  run  the exchange  rate  can deviate  from  strict  purchas- 
ing-power  parity, and the central  bank in an open economy can inde- 
pendently  control  the stock of reserves.  By contrast,  in the long run the 
exchange  rate must adhere  to purchasing-power  parity, so that (again 
given  the real  terms  of trade) the central  bank  can control  independently 
either  the  exchange  rate  or the stock  of reserves  but  not  both. 
The term-structure  equation,  V, stands  alone in the long run, under 
either  interpretation  of equations  I-IV. Since  it is a separate  one-equation 
system  l iith two variables,  in equilibrium  it can merely  determine  one of 
the (nominal) interest-rate  levels  given  the other.5L 
51. An  additional mechanism, presumably combining the principles of  Fisher 
and Tobin, would be  necessary to  determine nominal interest rates in long-run 
equilibrium;  see Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest (Macmillan, 1930), especially 
chaps. 5 and 19, and James Tobin, "Money and Economic Growth,"  Econometrica, 
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PROCESSING  THE  INFORMATION 
IN  MONEY-STOCK  OBSERVATIONS 
How serious  is the inefficiency  of the intermediate-target  procedure 
associated  with its incorrect inference-and-adjustment  mechanism  for 
processing  the information  contained  in observations  of the money  stock? 
Given  the reduced  form  of the small  econometric  model  developed  above, 
it is straightforward  to associate  empirical  magnitudes  with the various 
concepts  in the first two examples  of the intermediate-target  procedure 
used above.52  In order to abstract  from the interesting  but complicated 
issue of how the real-price  mix of nominal  income  influences  the appro- 
priate  monetary  policy, the analysis  here  takes (the growth  rate  of) nomi- 
nal  income  itself  to be the  ultimate  policy  target. 
When the information  asymmetry  that motivates the Open Market 
Committee  to adopt  an intermediate-target  approach  consists  of the ability 
to monitor  the money  stock  but not income  on a within-quarter  basis, the 
policy-adjustment  mechanism  indicated  by the intermediate-target  pro- 
cedure  is equivalent  to using  the emerging  money  surprise  (Mt -M  *) to 
form the key expectation  of the reduced-form  income  residual  Eyt, anal- 
ogously  to equation  17 in the IS-LM  model,  as 
(22)  E(eyt)  =  -10(Mt-M*), 
where f  and 0 are again the model's reduced-form  coefficients  relating 
the policy instrument  to the money stock and nominal  income, respec- 
tively. By contrast,  the correct  expression  for inferring  the expectation  of 
eYt  on the basis of (Mt -M*),  analogously  to equation  18 in the IS-LM 
model,  exploits  the true  variance-covariance  structure  of the model's  vari- 
ous structural  disturbances  to identify  the covariation  of the reduced-form 
residuals  Ey and EM-. In other words, while the intermediate-target  pro- 
cedure  assumes  that all surprises  (Mt -  M*) #? 0 are simply  reflections 
of U1st,  the correct  procedure  separates  out the likely sources  of the com- 
pound  error  eMt within  the model's  estimated  variance-covariance  matrix. 
In addition,  after  determining  how much  of the money  surprise  to offset, 
the correct  procedure-unlike the intermediate-target  procedure-allows 
for the interest  elasticity  of money demand  in calculating  the offsetting 
policy  action. 
52.  Since the econometric model does not exhibit the lag structure assumed in 
equations 1' and 2', it cannot be used to analyze the third example based on a struc- 
tural lag. Benjamin  M. Friedman  329 
Applying  the estimated  model's reduced  form to this analysis  yields 
the following  results:  If the monetary-policy  instrument  is the short-term 
interest  rate,  the  intermediate-target  mechanism  yields  the inference 
E(eyt)  =  0417(Mt  -M*), 
while  the  correct  inference  is 
E(eyt)  =  0.71 1(Mt  -M*). 
If the monetary-policy  instrument  is reserves, the intermediate-target 
mechanism  again  yields  the inference 
E(eyt) =  0.417(Mt  -M*), 
while  the correct  inference  is 
E(eyt)  =  0.678(Mt  -M*). 
In either  case, the inefficiency  in the way  the intermediate-target  approach 
exploits the information  contained  in money-stock  observations  is sub- 
stantial,  leading  to a policy response  that differs  markedly  from the cor- 
rect  optimal  response.53 
When the information  asymmetry  that leads the Open Market  Com- 
mittee to adopt an intermediate-target  approach  consists  instead  of the 
beginning-of-quarter  availability  of the previous  quarter's  money-stock 
value but not the corresponding  income value, the policy-adjustment 
mechanism  indicated  by the  intermediate-target  procedure  is equivalent  to 
using the observed money surprise (Mt-  -  M*l)  to infer cyt,  anal- 
ogously  to equation  20 in the  IS-LM  model,  as 
(23)  E(eyt)  =  V1pM(Mt_l  -  t*  ), 
where  pM  is again  the indirect  serial-correlation  coefficient  of sM. By con- 
trast, the correct  expression  for inferring  the expectation  of syt on the 
basis of (Mt,  -  Mt*),  analogously  to equation  21 in the IS-LM  model, 
again  exploits  the true underlying  variance-covariance  structure. 
53. For the model estimated with the interest  rate treated as exogenous, the four 
numbers reported in the text are, respectively, 0.346, 0.655, 0.346, and 0.564. The 
apparently  counterintuitive  result that the intermediate-target  procedure  leads mone- 
tary policy to underestimate  the income disturbance-that  is, to undershoot  the cor- 
rect interest-rate  adjustment-is  due to the effect of b2 #&  0 in equation 17 dominating 
the effect of a2fM =  0 in equation 18. Given the negative interest elasticity of money 
demand, the interest-rate  adjustment  that merely returns  M to the original M* is not 
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Applying  the estimated  model's reduced  form to this analysis  yields 
the following  results:  If the monetary-policy  instrument  is the short-term 
interest  rate,  the intermediate-target  mechanism  yields  the inference 
E(eyt) =  0.0197(M  1  -M  1), 
while  the  correct  inference  is 
E(eyt) =  0.266(Mt  -  Mt*-1). 
If  the monetary-policy  instrument  is reserves, the intermediate-target 
mechanism  yields  the inference 
E(eyt)  =  -0.00561(Mt1  -M*t), 
while  the correct  inference  is 
E(cy)  =  0.246(Mt1  -Mt*-). 
In either  case, the small serial  correlation  in the (M -  M*) series  leads 
the intermediate-target  procedure  to yield a negligible (and, when the 
instrument  is reserves,  even perverse)  policy response,  in contrast  to the 
substantial  response  indicated  by the correct  exploitation  of the informa- 
tion contained  in the observation  of the previous  quarter's  money  stock.54 
Given the limitations  of the underlying  macroeconometric  model, the 
failure  of the monetary-target  approach  to perform  well in these simple 
tests clearly  does not provide  the last word on the subject.  Nevertheless, 
these tests are instructive,  at the very least in that they demonstrate  the 
need for analysis  of the intermediate-target  procedure  based  on more so- 
phisticated  models.55  On the basis of these tests alone, the inefficiency 
of the intermediate-target  procedure  based on the money stock as the 
intermediate  target  variable  appears  to be substantial. 
A  DIGRESSION  ON  STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS 
The earlier  discussion  of the theory  underlying  the strategy  and tactics 
of monetary  policy shows for the IS-LM model that the Open Market 
54.  For the model estimated with the interest rate treated as exogenous, the four 
numbers  reported  in the text are, respectively,  0.0412, 0.323, 0.0145, and 0.278. 
55.  In addition, it would be useful to generalize the analysis by relaxing the as- 
sumption that the exogenous variables and the model's coefficients  are known with 
certainty; see  William Brainard, "Uncertainty and the  Effectiveness of  Policy," 
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Committee's  choice between  a directly  implementable  strategy  based on 
the short-term  interest  rate and the alternative  based  on the money  stock 
-which  requires  some tactics for monetary  control-depends on the 
comparison  of Ulr,  in equation  6 and  a'YIM  in equation  8. The model  pre- 
sented above, which is an expanded  IS-LM structure,  is also interesting 
for its implications  for the gross orders  of magnitude  involved  in mone- 
tary  policy  apart  from  the intermediate-target  approach  per  se. 
First,  at the strategy  level, the comparison  indicated  by the model (ex- 
pressed,  for ease of interpretation,  as standard  deviations  rather  than 
variances)56  is 
Cylr  =0.852% 
versus 
eIYIM =  0.788%. 
Given  the  U.S. nominal  gross  national  product  in 1976, these  two standard 
deviations  in the quarterly  growth  rates  correspond  to dollar  magnitudes 
of $14.5 billion versus $13.4 billion at annual  rates. Hence the model 
does imply  an advantage-albeit an extremely  small  one-for  use of the 
money  stock  at the strategy  level.57 
A well-known  contradiction  inherent  in the two-stage strategy-and- 
tactics approach,  however, concerns the controllability  of the money 
stock.58  In particular,  the very  existence  of the tactics  stage  of the analysis 
contradicts  a key assumption  made at the strategy  stage, since the ex- 
pected squared  deviations  in equations  6 and 8 are valid only under  the 
assumption  that it is indeed  possible  to set r precisely  equal  to r* and M 
to M*. If the interest  rate  and the money  stock are instead  variables  with 
expectation  E(r)  =  r*  and  E(M)  =  M*  but  with  nonzero  variances 
56. Throughout the following discussion, all estimated standard deviations for 
AY and AM are multiplied by 100 to permit interpretation  in terms of percentage 
growth rates. The values used in the underlying calculations are the variances and 
covariances of the white noises rather than the disturbances  themselves, so that the 
analysis here assumes the ability of policy to take full advantage of past observa- 
tions; equivalent calculations based on the disturbances  show no interesting  differ- 
ences. 
57. For the model estimated wtih the interest rate treated as exogenous, the cor- 
responding  standard  deviations are a,,,,  =  0.816% and aylm = 0.772%. 
58.  See, for example, Friedman, "Targets,  Instruments, and Indicators";  Poole 
and Lieberman, "Improving  Monetary Control"; and Pierce and Thomson, "Some 
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c2  and c2,  then the correct  expressions  for cy are different  from-spe- 
cifically,  larger  than-equations 6 and  8. 
Since the r5 variable  used here is a nominal  short-term  yield, it is rea- 
sonable  to suppose  that  in the short  run  the Open  Market  Committee  can 
set this variable  as a true  instrument,  so that 2rq  = 0 and  the value shown 
above  for ay  I  is correct.  By contrast,  the fundamental  motivation  for the 
tactics  stage  of the analysis-as well as the intermediate-target  procedure 
-arises  because  surprises  occur  in the endogenous  variable  M as well as 
in Y. Apart from the covariance  between  ey and e,a therefore,  the  2y4m 
value corresponding  to  fYIM is too small in that it omits a term equal  to 
the relevant r2 multiplied  by a coefficient  equivalent  to the square  of P in 
equation  4. 
How serious  is the omission,  at the strategy  stage of the analysis,  of 
the noncontrollability  of the money stock?  It is, of course,  possible  that, 
even if the relevant  variances,  covariances,  and slope coefficients  suggest 
that the money stock  is a better  focus of monetary  policy than are inter- 
est rates, the interest-rate  strategy  may be superior  after all, given the 
achievable  precision  of control  over the money stock. Is this in fact the 
case? 
For several  reasons  it is difficult  to evaluate  the degree of achievable 
monetary  control. First, as William  Poole and Charles  Lieberman  have 
shown, many of the barriers  to close monetary  control are institutional 
arrangements  that in principle  could be changed  if the Federal  Reserve 
and the Congress  considered  monetary  control sufficiently  important.59 
Second,  even under  current  arrangements,  the Open  Market  Committee's 
short-run  objective  of preserving  stability  in the money market  (that is, 
in interest  rates) precludes  interpreting  the observed  degree  of monetary 
control as the feasible  maximum.  Third,  the fluid state of both banking 
arrangements  and  estimated  equations  for money  demand  and  supply  ob- 
scures the degree  to which previous  empirical  work on this question  is 
relevant-especially for  M2. 
The econometric  model presented  above, however, can provide an 
upper  bound  on the a,  measure  in question-but only on the implausible 
assumption  that  income  is known.  For given  real output  and  prices,  solv- 
ing out the model's  LM curve  and  money-supply  equation  yields  the value 
oMIr,  =  0.601% 
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when  the  policy  instrument  is the short-term  interest  rate  versus 
0UMIR =  0.926% 
when the policy instrument  is reserves.  Given the level of M2 for De- 
cember  1976, these  two standard  deviations  in the quarterly  growth  rates 
correspond  to dollar  magnitudes  of $4.4 billion  versus  $6.8 billion. 
If these results truly reflected  the feasible precision  of control over 
M2, they would in the first  instance  indicate  that at the tactics  level the 
interest  rate  is a better  choice  than  reserves  as the instrument  of monetary 
policy. In addition,  allowing  for the estimated  imprecision  of monetary 
control  changes the estimate  of aylIM  from the value shown above to 
UYI(M)Irs  =  0.827% 
when  the  instrument  is the  interest  rate  and 
UYI(M)IR  =  0.846% 
when  the instrument  is reserves.  Since  the implications  for income  of im- 
precise  monetary  control  are apparently  small, as measured  via the mod- 
el's reduced  form, in neither  case does allowing  for imperfect  monetary 
control at the tactics stage overturn  the initial conclusion  favoring  the 
money stock at the strategy  stage-although in both cases it makes an 
already  thin  margin  even  thinner. 
Nevertheless,  since the aMIr8 and aMIR  values derived  from the quar- 
terly econometric  model do not allow for within-quarter  monitoring  of 
the money  stock  and  consequent  adjustment  of the policy  instrument,  they 
provide  in this sense only a pair  of upper  bounds  that (along with a zero 
lower  bound) bracket  the true  values  of achievable  monetary  control.  A 
monthly  or weekly model, which lies beyond the scope of this paper,  is 
necessary  to refine  these  estimates. 
Finally,  how about  simply  setting  the stock of reserves  so as to influ- 
ence income, and ignoring  the money stock?  Here the estimated  model 
indicates  the  value60 
UYIjR =  0.827%. 
In sum,  a comparison  of all of the ay values  shown  here  indicates  that, at 
least on the basis  of the simple  econometric  model  presented  above,  there 
60. The fact that ay  I R  and ay I (m) Ir  are both reported as 0.827 percent is due 
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is little empirical  ground  for arguing  the superiority  of one short-run 
monetary  policy  instrument  over  another. 
Conclusions  for Monetary  Policy 
At the conceptual  level this paper offers two basic criticisms  of the 
current  monetary-policy  strategy  based on the money stock as an inter- 
mediate-target  variable. 
First, the intermediate-target  procedure  based on monetary  targets 
is a useful  but in general  an inefficient  way of exploiting  the information 
contained  in near-term  observations  of the money stock. Except under 
the highly restrictive  conditions  that the demand  for money is both in- 
terest  insensitive  and perfectly  stable (neither  of which receives  support 
from the empirical  investigations  in this paper  or elsewhere), the inter- 
mediate-target  procedure  is in general inferior  to an alternative,  more 
general,  procedure  for adjusting  policy  in light  of the relevant  information 
contained  in observed  money-stock  values. 
Second,  the intermediate-target  procedure  based on monetary  targets 
suffers  from the further-and potentially  more damaging-shortcoming 
of hindering  monetary  policy from exploiting  the near-term  flow of in- 
formation  contained  in observations  of variables  other than the money 
stock.  With  information  as scarce  as it is, any that nonmonetary  sources 
offer should be exploited; and the use of the intermediate-target  pro- 
cedure,  in contrast  to a more general  "information  variable"  procedure, 
leads  to a mistaken  strategy  of exploiting  only those  variables  that  are  not 
only  observable  but  also  largely  "controllable"  in the short  run. 
At the empirical  level the paper  provides  some limited evaluation  of 
the  first  of these  criticisms.  Results  based  on a compact,  analytically  tract- 
able  macroeconometric  model estimated  particularly  for this application 
indicate  that  the intermediate-target  procedure  based  on monetary  targets 
exploits  the information  in money-stock  observations  with substantial  in- 
efficiency.  This procedure,  which  involves  responding  to observed  devia- 
tions of the money stock from the targeted  growth  path so as to restore 
money  to that  path,  calls  for a monetary-policy  response  that  differs  mark- 
edly  from  that  which  a correct  processing  of the information  contained  in 
the  observed  deviations  would  warrant-regardless  of whether  the instru- 
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The basic implication  of these analytical  and empirical  results  is that 
the Federal Open Market Committee  should not  seek to control the 
money stock as an intermediate  target  of monetary  policy. Even if on a 
near-term  basis  the committee  were to focus only on the money  stock,  its 
response to observed movements should still be  different  from that 
indicated  by the intermediate-target  strategy.  Perhaps  more important, 
the committee  should  focus not just on the money  stock  but rather,  at the 
very least, on an index of monetary  and credit aggregates.  In addition, 
the committee  should seek better  ways of incorporating  into its analysis 
the near-term  flow of information  from financial  variables  other than 
financial  aggregates,  and  from  nonfinancial  sources  too. The fundamental 
point is not that near-term  observations  of the money stock contain  no 
useful  information  for monetary  policy but only that they do not contain 
all such  useful  information.  While  money  should  not be the intermediate- 
target  variable  of monetary  policy, therefore,  it should be a useful and 
probably  an important  information  variable-but not the only one. 
Whether  these conclusions  constitute  criticism  or praise  of the current 
short-run  conduct of U.S. monetary  policy is an empirical  question  on 
which  this paper  draws  no judgment.  To the extent  that  the Federal  Open 
Market  Committee  does attempt  within  the short  run  to control  the money 
stock closely about  a predetermined  growth  target,  this analysis  indicates 
the direction  in which to change  current  operating  procedures.  Alterna- 
tively, to the extent  that the committee  already  pursues  systematically  a 
more flexible and comprehensive  short-run  operating  procedure,  this 
analysis  suggests  that it continue  to resist the frequent  urging  to narrow 
its focus onto short-run  control of the money stock. In either  case, the 
implications  for  future monetary  policy  are  clear. Comments  and 
Discussion 
James  Duesenberry:  I shall attempt  to develop  the central  logic of Fried- 
man's  paper  and also to dwell on some aspects  of that  logic that  deserve 
more  emphasis,  in my  judgment,  than  they  received  in the  paper. 
A good starting  proposition  is that  an unexpected  change  in the money 
supply  raises a question:  What  does it tell us and what should  be done 
about it? To put it more formally,  the Open Market  Committee  begins 
with a consistent  forecast  of the money supply,  reserves,  interest  rates, 
and income, taking  account  of relationships  that link these variables.  In 
light of where  they would like income  to move in the short  run,  they set 
either  a rate for federal  funds or a level of reserves  with the expectation 
that the influence  of that decision  on the money supply  will, in turn,  in- 
fluence income appropriately.  Suppose they develop this forecast on a 
quarterly  basis;  and  then suppose  that,  after  the first  month  of the quarter 
(say, April for the spring  quarter),  they get information  that the money 
supply  is not where  they expected  it to be. At that  point,  they  do not have 
information  about  the  level of income  during  April. 
The deviation  in the money  supply  for April  could,  in principle,  repre- 
sent any one of a number  of things: a shift  in the LM function;  an error 
in the prediction  of one of the exogenous  variables  that enter  into that 
function;  or a deviation  of income from its expected  value that changed 
the demand  for money. Or it could be a mere measurement  error.  Now 
the question  is, what information  is available  that can help the Federal 
Reserve  track down the source of the observed  deviation  in the money 
supply  from  its expected  value? 
One category  of such  information  relates  to financial  flows.  In attempt- 
ing to diagnose  events  in the latest  month,  one should  be hunting  for the 
best  current short-term  indicator,  which  is not necessarily  the best  leading 
336 Benjamin  M. Friedman  337 
indicator.  More significantly,  one would  have to relate  any new financial 
information  back  to the initial  prediction.  For example,  suppose  that the 
data on commercial  loans for April show a big, unexpected  rise, and  that 
there is general  empirical  evidence  that commercial  loans rise contem- 
poraneously  with inventory  investment.  If the initial  forecast  had called 
for only a modest  rate of inventory  investment,  the surge  in commercial 
loans might suggest that inventory  investment  had been unexpectedly 
strong  and had raised income above its anticipated  level, thereby  con- 
tributing  to the bulge in the money supply.  But that is information  only 
because the observed  rise in commercial  loans is inconsistent  with the 
prediction  of inventory  change.  If a high  rate  of inventory  investment  had 
been expected,  the big rise  in commercial  loans would  not serve  as a clue. 
The information  value  of any  new  data  to the Federal  Reserve  thus  de- 
pends  on the underlying  forecast  that  led the Federal  Reserve  to pick the 
actual  money target.  If, in fact, the Fed did not base that target  on any 
particular  consistent  and detailed  forecast,  then there  is no way for them 
(or anybody  else) to calibrate  the flow  of new information. 
In addition  to the financial  indicators,  a large variety  of nonfinancial 
information  may  help to track  down  the source  of a surprise  in the money 
supply.  During  April, the Federal  Reserve  will have received  scraps  of 
information  about  automobile  sales,  weekly  retail  sales,  and  the  like.  Even 
if no information  is available  about  activity  during  the month  of April as 
a whole, monthly  reports  on March  will have  come  in, supplying  informa- 
tion that was not available  at the beginning  of the quarter.  The policy- 
makers  know a lot more about  March  economic  activity  on May 1 than 
they knew on April 1. And that information  may help them to judge 
whether  the level of economic  activity  during  April was higher  than  they 
had anticipated  initially.  This is all part of the process of digesting  and 
interpreting  information  that  Friedman  describes. 
The paper next goes into a detailed  discussion  of the adjustments  in 
policy the Federal  Reserve  might  make once it has diagnosed  the source 
of the money surprise.  The right adjustment  obviously  depends on the 
size of the error  and the confidence  in the diagnosis,  but it also depends 
on the estimated  responses  of the system  to any adjustments  in policy  that 
might  be made. 
Given the way the system  responds,  in fact, any action taken by the 
Federal  Reserve  will not have much effect  in the current  quarter.  More- 
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by quarter,  might  jostle the money supply and interest  rates around  in 
wide ranges  that  may  impose  some costs  in themselves.  Hence,  the mone- 
tary-policy  decision  has to be made  in a somewhat  longer-term  context, 
looking at least another  quarter (if not several quarters) ahead. That 
longer  look must  be taken  with extreme  care  in assessing  the genuine  in- 
formation  content  of any indicators  that may be used to diagnose  short- 
term  deviations  in the money  supply.  It also must  face the issue of serial 
correlation.  Friedman  has an especially  interesting  discussion  of the role 
of serial-correlation  coefficients  in consecutive  quarters.  In some cases,  if 
the federal  funds  rate (or the path of reserves) is unchanged,  the money 
supply  will come back to its target  track.  But if that is not a reasonable 
prediction,  the Federal  Reserve  must decide whether  to work down the 
bulge  in the money supply  by tightening  its instruments  (as it should  for 
an IS disturbance)  or to leave its funds-rate  (or reserves)  instrument  un- 
changed  and accept the higher  money supply (as it should for an LM 
disturbance). 
All of these issues are  developed  in the paper  in a way that seems  per- 
fectly reasonable  and  illuminating  to me. Perhaps  the only new  point  that 
I am emphasizing  is the importance  of the Federal  Reserve's  initial  fore- 
cast as a benchmark  for interpreting  new information.  But I have more 
serious reservations  about the small econometric  model that Friedman 
introduces  to illustrate  this  process  concretely.  A number  of the elements 
in the model seem rather  peculiar  to me, and some of these are  the result 
of its compression.  In general,  I could not have much faith in a model 
that is so small (although  I am not sure that I could have much more 
faith in a larger  model). I do not feel that the model helps to guide us 
empirically  on what  ought  to be done in the face of an unexpected  devia- 
tion in the money supply. Indeed, any model concentrates  on additive 
error  terms,  and that may distract  attention  from the real uncertainty  in 
policy-the  wide variations  in plausible  values of the parameters  of the 
system. 
Finally, Friedman's  model continues  to focus on the extremely  short 
run. The horizon  should  be lengthened.  Once it is, the big new question 
is, how does one judge  whether  to make  an adjustment  in monetary  policy 
early on the basis of feeble information  or to delay it in hope of better 
information?  Suppose  that, in my initial example,  there  is some basis  for 
concluding  on May 1 that  the bulge  in the money  supply  should  be elimi- 
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able information  will be available  on the actual  course  of income  during 
the quarter.  The lead time in taking  corrective  action  is obviously  valu- 
able, but so is the fuller information.  My own off-the-cuff  inclination  is 
toward  waiting  a bit longer to see what happens.  Such issues should  be 
explored  in future  work; they have been neglected,  compared  with ex- 
tremely  short-run  adjustments.  Designing  a somewhat  longer-run  strategy 
in the face of inadequate  information  about the structure  of the system 
seems  to me the really  difficult  challenge.  Friedman  leaves that problem 
unsolved;  but  he has defined  more  sharply  than  ever  before  the issues  con- 
cerning  relevant  information  and rational  response  by the Federal Re- 
serve to information  and surprises.  Hence, the paper  has served  a very 
useful  purpose. 
William  Poole: I shall  begin  by interpreting  Friedman's  approach  to mon- 
etary  policymaking  within the structure  of the optimum  control model. 
Initially,  suppose  that the money  stock,  income, and the interest  rate are 
all observed  continuously.  In that case, we know that,  in general,  neither 
a monetary  instrument  nor an interest-rate  instrument  would  be optimal. 
The ideal policy would  be a combination  policy that  permits  both money 
supply  and interest  rates  to change  in response  to disturbances. 
Taking  the next step to reach the framework  within  which  Friedman 
conducts  his analysis,  suppose  that interest  rates are observed  continu- 
ously, but that the money  stock  is known  only with a one-month  lag and 
income with a one-quarter  lag. Then the combination  policy cannot  be 
followed  because  it is impossible  to maintain  a known  fixed relationship 
between  money  and interest  rates.  As Friedman  suggests,  one feasible  al- 
teruative  involves  controlling  the federal  funds  rate  and  changing  that  rate 
in response  to the monthly  observations  of the money stock. In imple- 
menting  such a policy,  it is obviously  not optimal  to maintain  the original 
money target  regardless  of anything  else that is learned  about  the econ- 
omy. 
Friedman  makes  the point  in the following  way. If the Federal  Reserve 
sticks  to its initial  monetary  target  when  it observes  a bulge  in the money 
stock,  then  it must  raise  the federal  funds  rate  by whatever  amount  it esti- 
mates to be necessary  to bring  the money stock back down to its target 
path. The required  rise in the interest  rate will reflect  the estimated  re- 
duction  in money  demand  associated  with (1)  an increase  in the interest 
rate, and (2)  the reduction  in income  brought  about  by the higher  inter- 340  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
est rate. The strategy  of bringing  the money  stock  back  to target  involves 
processing  the data, using certain  key parameters-the income and in- 
terest  elasticities  of money  demand  and the coefficient  of the interest  rate 
in the IS function.  These parameters  will permit  a calculation  of the size 
of the  required  change  in the interest  rate. 
The difference  between  the original  interest-rate  setting  and the new, 
revised  one is calculated  as though  the deviation  in the money  stock  was 
caused  entirely  by an IS disturbance.  Friedman  argues  that this estimate 
will in general not be correct  because it ignores the possibility  of dis- 
turbances  stemming  from the money-demand  function. Friedman  then 
derives  the optimal  inference  that attributes  money-growth  surprises  to 
some  combination  of money-demand  disturbances  and  IS disturbances. 
It turns  out, however,  that,  in the model Friedman  estimated  for illus- 
trative  purposes,  the optimal  inference  involves a larger adjustment  of 
interest  rates  than  would  be made  in the strategy  that  attributes  the devia- 
tion entirely to an IS disturbance.  This interesting  result is strikingly 
counterintuitive.  One would  think  that,  when  any  observed  surprise  in the 
money stock is attributed  to money-demand  disturbances  as well as IS 
disturbances,  part  of the deviation  of money  from  its expected  path  would 
be discounted.  In effect, Friedman  is suggesting  that monetary  policy 
would  not react  enough  to deviations  in money  if it followed  the strategy 
of sticking  to the initial money target  and ignored  the information  con- 
tained  in the  monetary  deviation. 
My concern,  however,  is that  Friedman's  characterization  of the inter- 
mediate-target  process  suffers  from  its concentration  on the two-equation 
IS-LM  model. In my view, the motivation  for the intermediate-target  ap- 
proach  is really  quite  different.  It rests  on the view that there  is a money- 
supply  function  operating  and  that an unexpected  deviation  in the money 
stock  is interpreted  primarily,  not as a reflection  of an IS disturbance,  but 
rather  as a money-supply  disturbance.  The reason  to reverse  the money- 
supply  disturbance  is precisely  to keep it from  feeding  into income. 
To understand  what I have in mind, consider  the microeconomic  sto- 
chastic money-demand  models in which money balances  may fluctuate 
between  upper  and lower  bounds  before  inducing  action.  For example,  a 
firm's  balances  may  fluctuate  stochastically  as a result  of accidents  of tim- 
ing of receipts and payments.  If the cash balance gets large (small) 
enough  then  Treasury  bills may  be purchased  (sold), but not every  $100 
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disturbance-whether  resulting  from  a disturbance  within  the commercial 
banking  system (such as a change  in holdings  of excess reserves) or re- 
sulting  from a disturbance  induced  by, or not offset  by, the central  bank 
(such as a change  in float) -can  affect  the amount  of money  held  without 
initially  feeding  back  on any  of the arguments  of a conventional  aggregate 
money-demand  function. 
In the context  of an aggregate  money-demand  function,  then,  a supply 
disturbance  may  simply  show  up in the error  term  of the demand  function. 
The important  distinction  here  is that  the error  appears  because  of a sup- 
ply disturbance  and not because  of a shift  in the deterministic  part  of the 
money-demand  function.  If the deterministic  part  of the demand  function 
remains  unchanged,  then the money-supply  disturbance  will eventually 
lead  to changes  in the arguments  of the  money-demand  function  as holders 
of money  react to a supply  of money  that is excessive  or deficient  at the 
initial  levels  of income  and  interest. 
On this view, the case for an intermediate  monetary  target  reflects  the 
desire to prevent  money-supply  disturbances  from existing  long enough 
to feed into income.  In the context  of Friedman's  model,  when  the money 
stock  is observed  after  the  fact  to have  been  higher  or lower  than  expected, 
given the pegged  federal  funds  rate, the inference  problem  involves  sort- 
ing out money-supply  disturbances  as well as IS and  money-demand  dis- 
turbances.  Abstracting  from  the very  real data  problems,  my guess  is that 
the vast bulk of weekly and monthly money-growth  surprises  reflect 
money-supply  disturbances  rather  than either  IS or money-demand  dis- 
turbances. 
Next, I have a few comments  on Friedman's  characterization  of the 
making  of Federal Reserve  policy. The paper  gives the impression  that 
the Federal  Reserve  has really  stuck  quite  religiously  to a monetary  target 
and has adjusted  interest  rates actively  in pursuit  of this target,  ignoring 
other relevant  information.  My impression  of the situation  is rather  the 
reverse-that the Federal Reserve  responds  to an enormous  amount  of 
information,  some of which  may be valuable  and some of which  may be 
useless or even misleading.  At each monthly  meeting  the Federal  Open 
Market  Committee  is in fact presented  with an enormous  briefing  book 
with  masses  of information.  Moreover,  I do not find  that  the federal  funds 
rate  has been moved  around  aggressively  in hot pursuit  of the money  tar- 
get path. Instead,  the stated  monetary  target for the near  term  is consist- 
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tively unchanged  setting  of the federal funds rate. As further  evidence 
that little attention  has been paid to short-run  monetary  control, I am 
impressed  that the Federal  Reserve  has not undertaken  institutional  re- 
forms that would enable  it to control  the money stock more accurately. 
Indeed,  the Fed has taken  steps  such as the introduction  of additional  re- 
serve  categories  with differing  required  reserve  ratios  that  make  it harder 
to control  money. 
The illustrative  empirical  results  in the paper,  as I interpret  them,  sug- 
gest that  it is pretty  much  of a draw  whether  the Federal  Reserve  pursues 
interest-rate  targets  or money-stock  targets.  I think  that  result  is probably 
correct,  in fact. As I see it, the real  issue is not so much  whether  the Fed- 
eral  Reserve  controls  the money  stock  or the interest  rate  in the short  run 
but whether  the instrument,  whichever  it is, is adjusted  promptly  and  de- 
cisively in the appropriate  direction.  Problems  arise because when the 
policymakers  set an interest-rate  target  they  put  themselves  into a position 
in which,  for reasons  mentioned  below, they tend  to keep that  instrument 
setting  unchanged. 
Thus,  in practice,  the  real  difference  in policy  effectiveness  arising  from 
the choice of instrument  arises  out of a tendency  toward  sluggish  com- 
mittee decisionmaking.  If a consensus  cannot  be reached  on action, the 
FOMC stands pat. The committee  is sensitive  to political pressures  to 
avoid  policy  reversals  and  hence  is reluctant  to push  the instrument  in one 
direction  one month and then to reverse  it the next. The political  pres- 
sures  to hold down interest  rates  make it difficult  not only to raise them 
but also to push them down  when that  is appropriate:  if the Federal  Re- 
serve  thinks  it will have to reverse  such a policy subsequently,  it expects 
more  criticism  from  the rate  movement  back  up than  approval  on the way 
down. Once an interest-rate  target  has been picked,  the great  tendency  is 
simply  to hold onto it. Substitution  of a short-run  reserves  target  for the 
federal funds target would not make committee decisionmaking  less 
sluggish  but would improve  monetary  policy because  it is so much less 
costly  to be sluggish  over  reserves  than  over  interest  rates. 
Finally, let me raise the issue of rational expectations.  Abstracting 
from  the most austere  version  of that  argument,  which  destroys  any  possi- 
bility  of constructive  stabilization  policy,  I would  argue  that at least some 
behavioral  relationships  of the private sector will look different  in the 
macroeconomic  model if the government  authorities  follow one policy 
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private  decisionmakers  take the character  of government  policy into ac- 
count.  Thus,  the choice of policy strategy  has to make  some difference  to 
macro model equations  as usually formulated;  that in itself upsets the 
basic assumption  of the optimal-control  model that the implications  of 
different  policy strategies  can be explored within a given structure  of 
private  behavior.  Ideally, one needs to know the structural  model of be- 
havior  with  money-stock  targets  and  that  with  interest-rate  targets  in order 
to determine  which policy regime  leads to a more stable economy.  This 
consideration  leads me to have serious  reservations  about the optimal- 
control approach.  We have to be extremely  careful  in drawing  lessons 
from  that  approach,  recognizing  that  it takes  no account  of rational  expec- 
tations. 
General  Discussion 
Frederic  Mishkin  underlined  the importance  of uncertainty  about  the 
structure  of economic  relationships  and their  parameter  values-a  prob- 
lem that, as Duesenberry  had noted, was not covered  by Friedman.  He 
thought  that money-supply  targets  might be defended  as a second-best 
way of reducing  the variance  of one factor  in a system  that  was  permeated 
with  uncertainty  about  its structure  and  its parameter  values. 
William  Fellner felt that the critical choice was not simply between 
formalizing  some relationships  and ignoring  others.  Policymakers  might 
take some information  into account  in an intuitive  or ad hoc fashion  and 
yet be reluctant  to model this linkage explicitly,  in view of the uncer- 
tainties  about  structure  and  parameter  values. 
Ralph  Bryant  wanted  to focus attention  on the two-stage  decisionmak- 
ing process  in the intermediate-target  approach.  At an "upper  level,"  pol- 
icymakers  decide what money stock is consistent  with ultimate  targets, 
such as income  and  the price  level; then, at a "lower  level,"  decisions  aim 
to manipulate  the instruments  to make  the money stock grow along that 
path. He summarized  the various  rationales  that might  be given  for such 
a two-stage  approach  and noted that  none was convincing.  In particular, 
as Friedman's  paper helped to show, however uncertain  policymakers 
were about  the model of the economy  and  whatever  the characteristics  of 
the information  available  to them at particular  points  in time, they could 
always  do better  by looking at several  variables  than  by putting  all their 
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Bryant  was also not convinced  by the argument  that the use of inter- 
mediate targets  was the best way to help private decisionmakers  form 
their  expectations.  Intermediate  variables  such as the money  stock  cannot 
be controlled  precisely  nor are they an ultimate  objective.  Policymakers 
could  better  inform  private  decisionmakers  by announcing  their  intentions 
with  respect  to their  ultimate  objectives  or the instruments  that  they  could 
actually  control,  or both. 
Arthur  Okun  felt that  the case for splitting  the decisionmaking  process 
into two parts  had to rest on the assumptions  ( 1  ) that what  really  drives 
the economy  is the  monetary  aggregate;  and (2) that  the  problem  of keep- 
ing the monetary  aggregate  on track  is best handled  by delegating  it to a 
group  of experts.  Then  it could  be best to fix the aggregate  target  with  no 
discretion  and give the experts  who have a feel for the market  the discre- 
tion to achieve  that  target  as best they can. Bryant  and Okun  agreed  that 
this  implied  an asymmetrical  use of information:  the data  helpful  in keep- 
ing money  on target  would  have to have no value in pointing  toward  the 
need  for a revision  of the target. 
William  Poole pointed  out that  it was  possible  to get a continuous  feed- 
back on the money supply,  but that observations  on economic activity 
came  infrequently,  with  lags  that  prevented  effective  control.  In the former 
case, one could, in effect,  use the steering  wheel to stay on the road;  in 
the  latter,  one could  not. 
Edward  Gramlich  reminded  Friedman  that another  important  type of 
information  neglected  in money-supply  targeting  was  that  relating  to exog- 
enous movements  in prices-grains, oil, imports  in general.  A change  in 
such prices  would call for a revision  of the money-supply  target. 
Participants  differed  in their  interpretations  of recent  Federal  Reserve 
actions.  Robert  Solomon  felt that  the Fed had  given  primacy  to M1  targets 
during  the spring  and summer  of 1977. In spite of a weakening  of eco- 
nomic  indicators,  they  had pushed  interest  rates  up sharply  in response  to 
an acceleration  of M1.  William  Poole countered  that neither  the current 
level nor the recent  movements  of interest  rates  suggested  that  the Federal 
Reserve  had worked  very hard to keep the aggregates  on target.  More- 
over, he had seen little evidence of the reduction  in the variability  of 
money growth  over time that should occur if a policy focusing  on mon- 
etary aggregates  was being diligently  pursued.  Okun suspected  that the 
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plied  to the choice  of monetary  targets  whereas  formerly  it had applied  to 
interest  rates.  He felt that  compelling  evidence  pointed  to the need for an 
upward  revision  in the M1  target  in light of the unexpected  slowdown  of 
velocity,  but that the Open Market  Committee  found it difficult  to alter 
the target  because  they would  be admitting  implicitly  that  they  had made 
a mistake.  Duesenberry  noted that the behavior  of M1  in 1977 led one to 
suspect  that it might be returning  to a more normal  historical  marginal 
relationship  with  the growth  of nominal  GNP. If that  was indeed  the case 
and the Federal  Reserve  did not adjust,  monetary  policy would be on a 
collision course with the economic expansion.  Solomon reminded  the 
group  that Chairman  Burns  had indicated  his willingness  to change  tar- 
gets  if significant  deviations  in velocity  developed. 
Friedman  cited the discussion  as evidence  of the difficulty  in reaching 
a consensus  on what  the Fed is actually  doing.  Recognizing  that  difficulty, 
he had tried  to be agnostic  on this question  in his paper.  He did cite the 
finding  of one study  that  the federal  funds  rate  was  increasingly  influenced 
by money  growth  during  the seventies.  In addition,  he noted  the behavior 
of the Open  Market  Committee  in sharply  raising  short-term  interest  rates 
during  the summer  after  M, had spurted  while  virtually  no other  available 
evidence suggested  excessive economic strength.  In fact, he observed, 
most of the debate over the economic outlook lately had been over 
whether  or not the economy  would  experience  a growth  recession  in 1978. 
Friedman  found  it amusing  that  everyone  tends  to think  that  the Fed does 
what  he personally  thinks  they ought  not to do. Those  who espouse  mon- 
etary  targets  feel that  policy  pays  little attention  to them;  those  who favor 
an eclectic indicators  approach  feel that the money supply  looms large 
in policymaking. 
In response  to Poole's  comments,  Friedman  noted  that  his analysis  did 
encompass  money-supply  behavior. For simplicity,  his exposition  had 
relied on the two-equation  IS-LM model. The analytical  principles  he 
was emphasizing  extended  in a straightforward  way to include money- 
supply  behavior,  however,  and the money supply  was explicitly  endog- 
enous in his empirical  work. 
Responding  to another  issue raised in the discussion,  Friedman  ex- 
pressed his own uncertainties  about the optimum  size of econometric 
models  for the purpose  of guiding  policy.  He reiterated  that  his model  was 
meant  to be illustrative;  yet he felt that  compact  models  of that  sort  might 346  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1977 
be an appropriate  middle  ground  between  cumbersome,  complex,  large- 
scale models and the single  equation  that encompassed  only income  and 
the money  stock. 
Finally,  Friedman  was puzzled  by the tendency  of some economists  to 
view single-minded  control  of the money  stock  as a fallback  position  justi- 
fied  by gross  uncertainty  about  how  the economy  works.  The risk  of major 
error  is reduced  thereby  only  if the money-stock  relationships  are  reliable. 
To advocate  close money-stock  control,  therefore,  also presumes  knowl- 
edge about economic behavior.  In fact, the recent behavior  of M1 has 
been unstable;  and  the more stable  behavior  of M2  cannot  be relied  on to 
continue  indefinitely. 